Parens Patriae and The States’ Historic Police Power by Thomas, Margaret S.
SMU Law Review
Volume 69 | Issue 4 Article 4
2016
Parens Patriae and The States’ Historic Police Power
Margaret S. Thomas
Louisiana State Univiersity, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, maggiethomas@lsu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Margaret S. Thomas, Parens Patriae and The States’ Historic Police Power, 69 SMU L. Rev. 759 (2016)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol69/iss4/4




Class actions have long been contracting as procedural vehicles in mass
tort litigation. At the same time, parens patriae actions brought by state
attorneys general for injuries to their states’ citizenry have been expanding.
This form of public dispute has emerged as a full-fledged alternative form
of aggregate litigation in mass torts. The use of this public alternative is
already widespread in consumer, antitrust, environmental, and health law
cases.
Despite the widespread use of parens patriae litigation by states, the
source of the power to sue in this way is vague and ill-defined. Courts have
struggled to articulate and explain the source and scope of the state’s power
to bring mass tort suits for injuries to the state’s populace, sometimes reach-
ing seemingly contradictory results.
Although the use of parens patriae power in mass tort litigation has been
both praised and criticized by complex litigation scholars, commentators
have largely overlooked the historical and constitutional functional role of
parens patriae litigation. This Article fills that gap by examining the states’
parens patriae power from the Framing Era to the modern era in order to
excavate the doctrine’s historical roots and purpose in our constitutional
structure. It debunks the false history used by modern courts to justify the
doctrine’s existence, suggesting courts have relied on a faulty foundation to
expand the doctrine. In so doing, this Article makes space for a new foun-
dation for parens patriae litigation rooted in the historic police powers of
the states.
This Article argues that the historic police powers of the states are inex-
tricable from parens patriae power. Modern mass tort litigation brought by
states is thus deeply connected to federalism in a way that traditional class
actions are not.
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INTRODUCTION
CLASS actions have been waning in importance as procedural ve-hicles in mass torts for many years.1 This purported demise ofclass actions has long been heralded by scholars.2 Indeed, the di-
minishing presence of class actions in the mass tort litigation landscape
has been a focus of academic commentary since at least the early 1990s,3
and the trend appears to have accelerated following recent Supreme
Court precedent imposing higher barriers to certification of class actions
in federal courts.4
Complex litigation scholarship has begun to focus on what will replace
class actions in mass tort litigation. Class actions resolve mass tort dis-
putes by binding absent class members through representative litigation.5
Other forms of aggregation can also accomplish this resolution through
different means. For example, multidistrict litigation and private claims
facilities have emerged as increasingly important alternatives to class ac-
tions.6 One of the most vibrant alternatives appears to be parens patriae
actions: civil suits brought by state attorneys general against mass
tortfeasors for injuries to the states’ citizenry.7 In fact, such state suits
have been experiencing a period of ascendance and expansion.8
1. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the
Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 658 (2012) (describing
class actions as being “on the ropes”); Jeremy Hays, The Quasi-Class Action Model for
Limiting Attorneys’ Fees in Multidistrict Litigation, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 589, 601
(2012) (discussing the waning utility of class actions under Rule 23 and the imperfect na-
ture of MDL as a replacement); Deborah R. Hensler, Goldilocks and the Class Action, 126
HARV. L. REV. F. 56, 56 (2012) (“Mass tort class actions have virtually disappeared . . . .”);
Margaret S. Thomas, Morphing Case Boundaries in Multidistrict Litigation Settlements, 63
EMORY L.J. 1339, 1346 & n.37 (2014).
2. See, e.g., Charles Silver, Comparing Class Actions and Consolidations, 10 REV. LI-
TIG. 495, 500 (1991) (applauding judicial consolidation of related suits); Michael A. Perino,
Class Action Chaos? The Theory of the Core and an Analysis of Opt-Out Rights in Mass
Tort Class Actions, 46 EMORY L.J. 85, 102 (1997); Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability:
The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373,
425–27 (2005); Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729,
828–29 (2013).
3. See Silver, supra note 2, at 500 (observing in the early 1990s that it was already true
that narrow interpretation of class action rules made it difficult for district judges “to craft
tort class actions that survive review”).
4. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 360 (2011) (holding that
“claims for individualized relief (like the backpay at issue here) do not satisfy [ ] Rule
[23(b)(2)].”); Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013).
5. See, e.g., Jaime Dodge, Disaggregative Mechanisms: Mass Claims Resolution With-
out Class Actions, 63 EMORY L.J. 1253, 1272 (2014) (discussing the increasing importance
of private claims facilities); Morphing Case Boundaries, supra note 1, at 1341 (discussing
multidistrict litigation’s role in mass tort litigation).
6. See, e.g., John E. Kennedy, Digging for the Missing Link, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1089,
1091 (1988) (reviewing STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO
THE MODERN CLASS ACTION (New Haven and Yale University Press 1987)).
7. See Prentiss Cox, Public Enforcement Compensation and Private Rights, 100 U.
MINN. L. REV. 2313, 2327–29 (2016).
8. See id. (describing consumer protection actions for the past fifteen years); Jack
Ratliff, Parens Patriae: An Overview, 74 TUL. L REV. 1847, 1847, 1858 (2000). For a defini-
tion of “mass tort,” see Morphing Case Boundaries, supra note 1, at 1349 n.48 (explaining
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Modern parens patriae actions generally involve a state (or sometimes
several states suing together) bringing claims that belong exclusively to
the state—or sometimes, bringing claims in a representative capacity be-
longing to its citizens.9 States usually (but not always) base their claims
on state or federal statutory authority.10 Sometimes states invoke a com-
mon-law form of parens patriae power based solely on their own sover-
eign interests.11 The common thread is that the state itself is the plaintiff,
asserting a guardianship role to protect itself and its citizens from alleged
harm. Some scholars observe that through these actions, states have be-
come the primary governmental enforcers of deceptive advertising and
antitrust laws.12
In the mid-1990s, use of parens patriae powers by state attorneys gen-
eral accelerated dramatically, with such suits becoming full-fledged alter-
natives to traditional class actions—with the successful, multibillion
dollar state litigation against the tobacco industry reflecting the full po-
tential of such litigation.13 Prior to that era, parens patriae suits had been
lightly utilized in antitrust and environmental pollution suits.14 With class
actions fading in mass tort litigation, suits brought by states on behalf of
citizens are now an increasingly prominent feature of a wide variety of
complex litigation.
Parens patriae cases are already distributing massive amounts of
money to plaintiffs in mass tort case settlements—sums that previously
would have been the subject of class actions. An example can be found in
the widely publicized settlement by three large book publishers with state
attorneys general over electronic book pricing in 2013, in which publish-
that the concept of “mass torts” generally “encompass[es] situations where many people
are injured either from a single accident or event, or use of or exposure to the same prod-
uct, and each has a claim for individual damages”).
9. See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative
Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486, 495–97 (2012) (observing state
and federal statutes granting attorneys general authority to recover damages for state citi-
zens and state attorneys general using parens patriae actions to seek damages and other
monetary remedies on behalf of their citizens); Colin Provost, An Integrated Model of U.S.
State Attorney General Behavior in Multi-State Litigation, 10 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 1, 1–2
(2010) (“While the overall number of [parens patriae] lawsuits as well as the number of
states participating has increased over time, some states are much more active participants
than others . . . .”) (internal citation omitted).
10. Cox, supra note 7, at 2324.
11. Cox, supra note 7, at 2327–29.
12. Provost, supra note 9, at 1.
13. Ratliff, supra note 8, at 1847 (“The success of the tobacco litigation has stimulated
new initiatives respecting guns, lead paint, and, most recently, health maintenance organi-
zations.”) (citations omitted); see also Richard P. Ieyoub & Theodore Eisenberg, State At-
torney General Actions, the Tobacco Litigation, and the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 74 TUL.
L. REV. 1859, 1883 (2000); William H. Pryor, Jr., A Comparison of Abuses and Reforms of
Class Actions and Multigovernment Lawsuits, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1885, 1902–03 (2000).
14. See Michael Malina & Michael D. Blechman, Parens Patriae Suits for Treble Dam-
ages Under the Antitrust Laws, 65 NW. U. L. REV. 193, 193–95 (1970) (discussing an in-
crease in the assertion of antitrust claims by state governments using parens patriae power
and observing that prior to 1970, only one decision reflected the use of that power in an
antitrust case); see also infra notes 207–223 and accompanying text (discussing environ-
mental cases).
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ers paid over $166 million to settle the claims.15 The same litigation also
produced roughly $400 million in liability for Apple.16 The settlement
money largely flowed back to consumers, in the form of credits sent by
retailers.17 Similarly, forty-three states recently reached a partial settle-
ment with Volkswagen worth $603 million over alleged faulty emissions
software in its automobiles.18 Meanwhile, three states are filing separate
suits of their own.19
Parens patriae is no longer an “up and coming” alternative to class
actions. It has already emerged as a fully viable, mature, and effective
alternative form of mass tort litigation, capable of resolving multi-state,
nine-figure complex claims. Despite this role, the states’ parens patriae
powers have received little attention from the U.S. Supreme Court in re-
cent years, at least compared to class actions.
In 2014, the Supreme Court finally seemed to acknowledge the role of
the states in mass torts in Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Cor-
poration,20 a decision that seems likely to accelerate the rise of parens
patriae suits as an alternative to class actions. This decision clarified that
these state-brought mass tort actions are not removable to federal court
under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) because they are not class
actions. They also are not subject to the array of procedural hurdles fed-
eral courts have developed as obstacles to class certification using Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23. The decision implicitly blesses litigating
parens patriae mass tort suits in state courts,21 using state procedural
rules, even though class actions involving the same torts would be remov-
able to federal court under CAFA and constrained by Rule 23’s rigorous
15. See Andrew Albanese, Publishers Have Paid $166 Million to Settle E-Book Claims,
PUBLISHERS WKLY (Jul. 24, 2013), http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/digital/
content-and-e-books/article/58412-publishers-have-paid-166-million-to-settle-e-book-
claims.html [https://perma.cc/2QL7-QYLB].
16. See James R. Hood, Appeals court upholds $400 million e-book price-fixing settle-




18. David Shepardson, Three U.S. States Plan Lawsuits over Volkswagen Diesel Pollu-
tion, REUTERS (July 18, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-volkswagen-emissions-id
USKCN0ZY2JU [https://perma.cc/7CND-J7LF].
19. See Complaint, Maryland Dep’t of Env’t v. Volkswagen, No. 24-C-16-004114 (Md.
Cir. Ct. July 19, 2016); Complaint, Massachusetts v. Volkswagen, No. 16-2266D (Mass.
Super. July 19, 2016); Complaint, New York v. Volkswagen, No. 9040212016 (N.Y. Sup.
July 19, 2016).
20. See 134 S. Ct. 736, 739 (2014) (holding that parens patriae actions (i.e., where the
state is the plaintiff) are not procedurally equivalent to class actions, under the Class Ac-
tion Fairness Act, despite some surface similarities).
21. See, e.g., Paul Thibodeaux & Danny Dysart, Supreme Court’s CAFA Decision
Changes Law in Fifth Circuit, A.B.A. SEC. LIT., http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/com-
mittees/pretrial/articles/spring2014-0614-supreme-courts-cafa-decision-changes-law-fifth-
circuit.html [https://perma.cc/AKL4-E9T7] (“While the practical result of Hood is that
state parens patriae actions are likely no longer subject to CAFA mass-action removal, a
broader question is whether Hood will encourage the filing of parens patriae actions in
place of traditional Rule 23 class actions, which have been increasingly difficult to
certify.”).
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requirements for class certification. In other words, parens patriae litiga-
tion can evade virtually all of the class action hurdles that have been er-
ected by Congress and the Supreme Court.
Parens patriae litigation is already a prominent feature in the legal
landscape of consumer, antitrust, environmental, and health law disputes.
However, the doctrine’s modern contours have long been vague and ill-
defined, particularly in regard to states raising claims for injuries to their
citizens. By the middle of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court had
virtually given up the task of defining the doctrine’s contours and simply
declared the meaning of parens patriae “[was] murky.”22 Despite its
amorphousness, the doctrine’s modern incarnation appears to be firmly
rooted in the pragmatic expansion of aggregate litigation in the mid-
twentieth century, developing independently of Rule 23.
The “murkiness” of parens patriae power has sometimes resulted in a
judicial struggle to articulate and explain when the state has authority to
bring mass tort suits for injuries to the state’s residents. Although pur-
porting to trace the concept of parens patriae back to the “royal preroga-
tive” of the English Crown at common law,23 the Supreme Court has
admitted that the venerable English royal prerogative “has relatively lit-
tle to do with the concept of parens patriae standing that has developed in
American law.”24 Those historical roots, however, continue to be invoked
in judicial opinions to legitimize the state power to sue in this capacity.
Historical skepticism of the doctrine led critics to call the parens pa-
triae powers in mass torts “disturbing”25 and “loopy.”26 Meanwhile, use
of these powers has been both praised for its effectiveness and efficiency
in comparison to class actions27 and critiqued for its potential to create
conflicts of interest in the state’s representation of citizens, leading to in-
adequate representation.28
Modern academic literature on parens patriae has primarily focused on
its efficiency and effectiveness in achieving the goals of complex litiga-
tion, by comparing parens patriae cases to class actions. Several scholars
have carefully evaluated the policy costs and benefits associated with a
robust parens patriae authority, reaching different conclusions about the
value of such litigation in the mass tort context.29 This debate has largely
22. See Ratliff, supra note 8, at 1850–51, 1851 n.18 (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16
(1967)).
23. See, e.g., Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592,
600 (1982).
24. Id.
25. Pryor, supra note 13, at 1913.
26. Ratliff, supra note 8, at 1851.
27. Edward Brunet, Improving Class Action Efficiency by Expanded Use of Parens
Patriae Suits and Intervention, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1919, 1939 (2000).
28. Lemos, supra note 9, at 492.
29. For examples of recent criticism of robust parens patriae authority as lacking in
adequate procedural protections for public claims, see Lemos, supra note 9, at 542; Michael
D. Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, The Agency Class Action, 112 COLUM. L.
REV. 1992, 1995–96 (2012); Donald G. Gifford, Impersonating the Legislature: State Attor-
neys General and Parens Patriae Product Litigation, 49 B.C. L. REV. 913, 914–16 (2008).
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overlooked the structural role of parens patriae cases in our constitu-
tional system—a role that fundamentally distinguishes the parens patriae
power from any other type of complex litigation. This Article contends
the policy debate comparing parens patriae to class actions ignores the
special role of the parens patriae power in our constitutional system—a
role that reflects different values and a different purpose than Rule 23’s
class actions.
This Article poses two foundational questions regarding the parens pa-
triae doctrine: (1) why does it exist in the American legal system at all,
and (2) what, if any, constitutional purpose does it serve? Through these
questions, this Article excavates the conceptual foundations of the doc-
trine’s application in complex litigation and demonstrates the doctrine’s
deep, historical roots in constitutional federalism, particularly in the
structural constitutional understanding of the late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth centuries.
This Article demonstrates that the modern parens patriae doctrine is a
feature of American federalism. Liberated from the English common law
pedigree and mythological royal roots, the doctrine’s American constitu-
tional contours become clearer, and its limits are revealed as an expres-
sion of the state’s historic police powers. Moreover, modern statutory
applications of the doctrine arguably comport with Framing-era under-
standings of sovereign power. Focusing on the relationship between the
parens patriae and the state’s historic police powers illuminates the defi-
ciency with modern policy debate that compares the power to Rule 23.
Despite the surface similarities, class actions under Rule 23 and parens
patriae actions by state attorneys general rely on different structural val-
ues and serve different purposes.
The Supreme Court apparently views the class certification device
under Rule 23 as a mere procedural joinder device.30 By contrast, the
parens patriae power of states to sue in mass tort actions is a feature of
federalism.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I summarizes the policy de-
bate regarding modern parens patriae suits, in which scholars view parens
patriae through the lens of class actions in complex litigation. The Article
then proceeds to show why that lens offers an incomplete understanding
of parens patriae.
For examples of defenses of parens patriae’s utility as an efficient, effective form of mass
litigation, see Gilles & Friedman, supra note 1, at 630, 660; Brunet, supra note 27, at
1932–34, 1936; Cox, supra note 8, at 2330–31.
30. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Ass’ns v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 408 (2010)
(Scalia, J., plurality) (describing Rule 23 as “a species” of “traditional joinder” because it
“merely enables a federal court to adjudicate claims of multiple parties at once, instead of
in separate suits”). The modern form of the class action device was largely created by the
1966 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, though earlier forms of class
actions had existed even under the old Equity Rules. See, e.g., Tom Ford, The History and
Development of Old Rule 23 and the Development of the Amended Rule 23, 32 ANTITRUST
L. J. 254, 254–55, 258–62 (1966).
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Part II examines the justifications for parens patriae’s application in
America, including the historical narratives regarding the English roots of
the modern parens patriae doctrine. The oldest, and most persistent of
these narratives, is dubbed her “the Sovereignty Transference theory,”
which posits that, at the time of the American Revolution, the new states
received the prerogatives of the English Crown. This Article reconstructs
the history of the doctrine from the Framing Era and identifies historical
errors embedded in its development. It identifies historical problems with
this theory, based on the understandings of the Framing generation and
argues that the Sovereignty Transference theory is untenable. The second
possible historical justification for parens patriae is dubbed “the Univer-
sal Sovereignty theory,” under which the parens patriae powers asserted
by the states are deemed to be inherent, universal powers that any func-
tioning state must possess. This theory emerged at the same time as fed-
eral general common law in other areas in the mid-nineteenth century
and reflects identical reasoning. It derives general, universal principles
and imputes them onto the states to create a common law supervisory
power. This Article argues that this federal theory of parens patriae did
not survive the Supreme Court’s abolition of federal common law in
1938,31 and it cannot offer a solid modern foundation to explain robust
state guardianship powers in mass tort ligation.
Part III shows that two variants of these theories invoked by the Su-
preme Court to justify parens patriae are an inadequate foundation for
the expansive modern use of the doctrine. It traces the historical expan-
sion of state use of parens patriae power and argues that modern confu-
sion about the doctrine flows from the lack of coherence in the doctrine’s
foundation. None of the classic justifications for parens patriae’s exis-
tence in America can carry the load of the modern application of the
doctrine.
In Part IV, this Article offers a different justification for parens patriae
power that situates the modern doctrine within our constitutional system.
It demonstrates that evolving understandings of the power have reflected
then-current contours of the states’ historic police powers. Indeed, the
power expanded in the early twentieth century in tandem with the scope
of the states’ police powers. This Article thus situates parens patriae as a
reflection of the states’ historic police powers in our constitutional sys-
tem. This understanding better explains the outcomes of cases and liber-
ates them from false historical frameworks that only cause confusion.
I. THE MODERN PARENS PATRIAE CONTROVERSY
A robust academic literature is developing that evaluates the merit of
parens patriae as a method of litigating mass torts. This literature focuses
on parens patriae as an alternative to, or replacement for, class actions.
31. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
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For this reason, it emphasizes the same values often used to evaluate the
utility of class actions.
Several commentators have emphasized the pragmatic benefits of
parens patriae actions in the mass tort context. Professor Gilles and Mr.
Friedman have called for greater use of parens patriae powers to fill the
void created by the demise of class actions.32 They emphasize the effi-
ciency benefits and effectiveness of parens patriae as an alternative pro-
cedural vehicle. Professor Brunet has also carefully outlined the
efficiency benefits flowing from state representation of citizens in dam-
ages class actions, including improved overall effectiveness that remedies
some of the classic problems with class actions.33 These scholarly ap-
proaches treat parens patriae as a substitute procedural vehicle for
aggregation.
In contrast, Professor Lemos has critiqued the value of representative
suits brought by states because they mimic class actions. She suggested
that a long-standing, influential law-and-economics critique of private
class actions could potentially apply with equal force when states re-
present their own citizens: namely possible conflicts of interest,34 lack of
client monitoring and control,35 and incentives to settle cases too
cheaply.36 She also claimed that these problems can create due process
concerns when states assert mass-tort claims on behalf of their citizens
where the state action can preclude future individual claims that may not
have been adequately represented by the state.37 The force of this cri-
tique militates in favor of greater procedural regulation of them, probably
along the lines of the closer scrutiny that class actions have experienced.
In other words, it tends to suggest that Rule 23’s complexity should be
grafted onto parens patriae actions.
Professor Cox has recently responded by showing the concerns raised
in academic critics of parens patriae are not borne out in practice and that
the critique overstates the risk of preclusion of private claims.38 He
pointed to copious precedent suggesting parens patriae litigation gener-
32. Gilles & Friedman, supra note 1, at 630, 660 (“In our view, state attorneys gen-
eral—alone among public enforcers—have the ability to fill the void left by class actions,
primarily through expanded use of the parens patriae powers . . . .”).
33. Brunet, supra note 27, at 1932–34, 1936.
34. Lemos, supra note 9, at 512–13.
35. Id. at 518–22.
36. Id. at 522–29.
37. Id. at 540–41; accord Verity Winship, Policing Compensatory Relief in Agency Set-
tlements, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 551, 552 (2013); Seth Davis, Implied Public Rights of Action,
114 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 45 (2014).
38. Cox, supra note 8, at 2336–37 (“The case law is reasonably clear that public com-
pensation generally does not result in preclusion of private claims for monetary relief. Ac-
cordingly, concerns about Due Process protections for recipients are misplaced.”); id. at
2344–45 (“Because no judicial decision holds that preclusion of private monetary relief
claims follows public compensation from a state attorney general action without procedu-
ral protections similar to a class action, the Lemos article is plainly wrong about the pre-
vailing view of courts, especially when that assertion is directly contrary to substantial case
law and practice patterns.”); id. at 2360 (“[U]rging class action procedures only as to public
compensation misconstrues the purpose and operation of public enforcement.”).
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ally does not preclude later claims for monetary damages by private
plaintiffs.39 Moreover, it would seem that any hypothetical excessive pre-
clusion issues (allegedly flowing from citizens potentially losing claims
settled too cheaply by states) would be a matter of fine-tuning preclusion
doctrine to preserve those claims, and not an inherent defect of parens
patriae doctrine itself.
Professor Gifford also observed that the settlements created by such
litigation, targeting entire industries, act as a form of regulation, without
the involvement of any legislature—creating separation of powers con-
cerns at the state governmental level.40 This contribution is helpful be-
cause it emphasizes state governmental values in the critique.
Critiques and defenses largely focus on the practical effects of the doc-
trine’s application in the mass tort context tend to evaluate parens patriae
litigation by the same metrics used to measure the effectiveness of repre-
sentative suits under Rule 23. These contributions leave the structural ra-
tionale for parens patriae in American federalism submerged in the
debate.
The murky historical foundation underlying the doctrine has not been
challenged or examined in these critiques or defenses of the modern ap-
plication of the doctrine. Despite the scholarly division about doctrinal
contours and utility, there is little doubt that the doctrine is well en-
trenched and expanding. These scholars fall into two camps: one recom-
mends putting the brakes on that expansion, and the other advocates for
continuing the expansion—largely for instrumental reasons.
This Article seeks to move beyond those instrumental reasons (such as
efficiency and accuracy), to focus instead on the structural role parens
patriae actions play in our federal system. Part II thus turns to the history
and purpose of state parens patriae power as an independent doctrine,
with a different systemic function than Rule 23 aggregation.
II. AMERICAN SOURCES OF PARENS PATRIAE POWER
Two theories of parens patriae power dominate the Supreme Court’s
precedent. The first, and by far the most important, posits that states in-
herited the English king’s prerogatives to act as “guardian of the realm”
at the time of the American Revolution, and that these royal prerogatives
are the foundation for state parens patriae power. This Part argues both
premises are false: the states neither inherited royal prerogatives in the
manner described in the cases nor were those prerogatives the real source
of American parens patriae power.
This false theory of the doctrine’s origin can be described as the “Sov-
ereignty Transference” theory of parens patriae. Part II.A explores the
rise of the Sovereignty Transference theory in American jurisprudence
39. See Cox, supra note 8, at 2337–39; see also Hensler, supra note 1, at 58–59 (dis-
agreeing with Lemos).
40. See Gifford, supra note 29, at 920, 930.
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and contrasts it with nature of the king’s power in England at the time of
the American Revolution, and the conceptual problems with purported
transference. It concludes that transference of any power from the En-
glish king to the states after the American Revolution was complicated by
the existence of English statutory authority constraining the Crown’s
guardianship power. States received and repealed this statute inconsis-
tently. In fact, cases from the Framing Era showed courts at that time
were acutely aware of the problem such statutory reception posed.
Part II.B examines a second theory of parens patriae that emerged in
the mid-nineteenth century. This second theory asserts that the power
was a reflection of inherent sovereignty. This Article dubs this the “Uni-
versal Sovereignty” theory of parens patriae, based on its claim that the
power reflects some feature of universal governance. This theory
emerged through the vehicle of general common law in an era when fed-
eral courts were still in the business of deriving such law from general
principles. This theory was rarely invoked, but it seems to have vanished
after the Supreme Court obliterated the federal general law.
A. THE SOVEREIGNTY TRANSFERENCE THEORY OF
PARENS PATRIAE POWER
1. The King as Guardian of the Realm
The parens patriae doctrine in America is commonly traced to the role
of English Crown as a guardian of realm.41 Under this view, the power
allegedly derived from the king’s duty “to take care of his subjects as are
legally unable” to care for themselves.42 This power reportedly encom-
passed legally protecting subjects lacking mental capacity (including chil-
dren and those afflicted by mental infirmity), as well as the oversight of
charitable trusts.43 The lord chancellor, as “keeper of the sovereign’s con-
science,” held this power in the king’s name and delegated it to English
chancery.44
The notion of the royal prerogative as the source of parens patriae
power in America appears to be rooted in Blackstone’s Commentaries on
the Laws of England, describing the king as “the general guardian of all
infants, idiots, and lunatics; and has the general superintendence of all
charitable uses in the kingdom. And all this over and above the vast and
extensive jurisdiction which he exercises in his judicial capacity in the
court of chancery.”45 This passage from Blackstone’s influential 18th-cen-
41. See, e.g., Ratliff, supra note 13, at 1850; George B. Curtis, The Checkered Career of
Parens Patriae: The State as Parent or Tyrant?, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 895, 896 (1976) (dis-
cussing Blackstone’s view of the power).
42. Curtis, supra note 41, at 896 (quoting J. CHITTY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE
PREROGATIVE OF THE CROWN 155 (1820)).
43. Curtis, supra note 41, at 896 & n.5.
44. See George E. Gardner, Charities and Trusts for Charitable Uses, in THE AMERI-
CAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAW 893, 901 (David S. Garland et al. eds., 2d ed.
1897).
45. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *47.
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tury treatise was quoted in one of the earliest U.S. Supreme Court cases
analyzing the power,46 and it has been repeated ever since.
Faith in the historical power of the English king being the foundation
for American parens patriae power persisted throughout the twentieth
century. For example, in 1972, in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Company of
California, the U.S. Supreme Court echoed Blackstone and declared the
doctrine had its roots in “the ‘royal prerogative,’” which included the re-
sponsibility to care for “all infants, idiots and lunatics.”47 With little ex-
planation, the Court concluded that the old English “royal prerogative”
and its attendant parens patriae power, belonging to the king, “passed to
the States” at the time of the American Revolution.48
The Standard Oil opinion makes this sweeping historical conclusion
without citing any sources or even offering arguments in support of the
claim. The Court treats the conclusion as self-evident. American parens
patriae power is depicted as simply emerging wholly formed from the
transference of the Crown’s power to the several states.
The Court’s conclusion regarding the transfer of the king’s prerogatives
to the states has not been interrogated by the scholarly literature—or
even the Court’s own subsequent opinions.49 In the leading historical
treatment of the doctrine published in 1976, George Curtis offered a de-
tailed account of the doctrine’s use in England and concluded that “[t]he
state has assumed [the king’s] mantle.”50 He offered no analysis to sup-
port this conclusion about transference—pointing instead to a handful of
Supreme Court decisions relying on the purported royal prerogative,
without any independent historical support.
This Article calls this mainstream historical explanation the Sover-
eignty Transference theory of parens patriae because its logic depends on
some vestige of the English Crown’s prerogatives transferring to the
states at some specific historical moment during the American Revolu-
tion. It thus requires two premises to be true: first, that such a royal pre-
rogative existed in England at the time of the American Revolution, and
second, that this power flowed through some mechanism to the newly
independent states.
Part II.A.2 examines both of these premises and concludes both are
dubious at best, and probably outright false.
2. The Mythology of Sovereignty Transference: Misunderstood
Prerogatives & the Forgotten English Statutory Scheme
Although modern American parens patriae cases assert that some gen-
eralized guardianship role of the English king transferring to the Ameri-
46. Trs. of Phila. Baptist Ass’n v. Hart’s Ex’rs, 17 U.S. 1, 47 (1819).
47. 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972) (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *47).
48. Id.
49. Scholars have generally taken the Court’s historical assertions at face value. See,
e.g., Lemos, supra note 9, at 493 n.22; Malina & Blechman, supra note 14, at 197–202.
50. Curtis, supra note 41, at 914.
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can states at Independence, early American cases discussing parens
patriae power reflected a more complex narrative. In fact, early cases uni-
formly rejected the notion of any “prerogative power” vested in the
courts of equity in the United States.51 In fact, the American Revolution
was arguably aimed at dispensing with the power of the king and, by im-
plication, the royal prerogatives of the English Crown.52
The early American court cases involving parens patriae presented
only a single form of the alleged royal guardianship prerogative: supervi-
sion of charities. Indeed, in the first half of the nineteenth century, this
was the sole context in which the Supreme Court discussed transference
of any royal prerogatives and parens patriae power. As will be explained
below, the states’ power over charities was the foundational parens pa-
triae power in the Framing Era.
Blackstone and other English sources described the king’s supervision
of charitable trusts as one of the core royal prerogatives, exercised
through the lord chancellor.53 This particular royal prerogative came up
over and over again in early parens patriae cases in the first few decades
of the American Republic: the first parens patriae cases after the Framing
involved the need for states to use that discretionary sovereign power to
reform charitable bequests. The king’s power over charities is the neces-
sary starting point to test the transference theory because it was the royal
prerogative courts focused upon in the Framing Era.
As a matter of first principles, A.V. Dicey observed that the entire
“power of the English state is concentrated in the Imperial Parliament.”54
Parliament is the ultimate sovereign in England,55 but it is not a singular
entity: it consists of the Crown, the House of Lords, and the House of
Commons.56 It acts through all three constituent parts together, in order
to enact legislation.57 The result is that when Parliament acts, the Crown
alone lacks discretionary authority over the matter.58 Executive powers
must nearly always be exercised under Acts of Parliament.59 This funda-
mental English constitutional feature is a significant (and intentional)
constraint on the monarchy.60 It is thus axiomatic that Parliament can
51. See Garland, supra note 44, at 901 (cataloging early state and federal cases).
52. See, e.g., In re Mun. Suffrage to Women, 36 N.E. 488, 492 (Mass. 1894) (J. Holmes)
(“Hobbes urged his motion in the interest of the absolute power of King Charles I., and
one of the objects of the constitution of Massachusetts was to deny it.”).
53. BLACKSTONE, supra note 45, at *427; Curtis, supra note 41, at 896 & n.5.
54. A.V. DICEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITU-
TION 86 (8th ed., 1982); see also id. at 4 (“The power and jurisdiction of Parliament . . . is so
transcendent and absolute, that it cannot be confined, either for causes or persons, within
any bounds.”) (quoting 4 SIR EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND 36
(London, 1644)); id. at 25 (“This doctrine of the legislative supremacy of Parliament is the
very keystone of the law of the constitution.”).
55. Id. at 271.
56. Id. at 268.
57. Id. at 2.
58. Id. at 271.
59. Id. at 268.
60. DICEY, supra note 54, at 268 (explaining that it “prevents those inroads upon the
law of the land which a despotic monarch . . . might effect by ordinances or decrees”).
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constrain royal prerogatives.
The parliamentary sovereignty described by Dicey in 1895 was already
firmly entrenched in England by the end of the eighteenth century, at the
time of the American Revolution.61 Thus, the Framing generation in the
United States would have understood the concept of the King-in-Parlia-
ment, where the Crown functioned as merely one of Parliament’s three
constituent parts. The notion of benevolent, absolutist monarchs serving
as guardians of the realm would have likely seemed at best fanciful and at
worst downright dangerous to the Framers.62 Indeed, the idea of it con-
tradicted the core premise of the American Republic, where sovereignty
in the constitutional compact flows from the people through the Constitu-
tion to the states and federal government,63 and not from the king (or
even Parliament) down through the rest of the government.64
The concept of parliamentary sovereignty in England necessarily im-
plies that Parliament, acting collectively, has power over the Crown, act-
ing alone.65 Indeed, Dicey observed that even the King’s own “claim to
reign depends upon and is the result of a statute.”66 Dicey showed this
principle was settled in England by the seventeenth century.67 By 1610, it
was judicially settled that the Crown had no power to make law, and the
Crown’s power had been checked by Parliament.68 This had implications
for the royal prerogatives.
Continental notions of powerful royal prerogatives, popularized in
France, had a short run in England during the Stuart line into the seven-
teenth century.69 In a time of religious and political turmoil, the Crown
had unprecedented power, ultimately leading to increased power of the
dreaded Star Chamber as an expression of the royal prerogative.70 This
61. See James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III and the Scottish Judiciary, 124
HARV. L. REV. 1613, 1644 & n.171 (2011).
62. See Daniel D. Birk, Marbury, Hayburn’s Case, and the Separation of the Judicial
and Executive Powers (July 20, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2811668 [https://perma.cc/U7D8-M6NW].
63. See U.S. CONST. pmbl.
64. An astute observer of the American Republic, Dicey noted that the English parlia-
mentary sovereignty distinguished it from our federal constitutional system, where residual
power that is not vested in Congress belongs to the states. See DICEY, supra note 54, at
73–74. By contrast England has no such structure. Id. Acts of Parliament can be repealed
by Parliament (but not by the king alone). Id. at xlii.
65. Id. at 5 (“True it is, that what the Parliament doth, no authority upon earth can
undo.”) (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, *160–61).
66. Id. at 6.
67. Id. The reign of Henry VIII and an Act of Parliament granting the Crown power
to legislate in parallel in 1529 was the high-water mark of the Crown’s power in England,
and it was relatively short-lived and soon repealed, according to Dicey, because “of its
inconsistency with the whole tenor of English law.” Id. at 11.
68. Id. at 13 (explaining that such proclamations “serve to call the attention of the
public to the law, but they cannot of themselves impose upon any man any legal obligation
or duty not imposed by common law or by Act of Parliament.”).
69. Id. at 242.
70. See id. at 242–43 (describing Bacon’s archaic view that the royal “prerogative was
something beyond and above the ordinary law” being akin to French monarchic institu-
tions); see also Pfander & Birk, supra note 61, at 1644 n.171 (discussing the end of the
“absolutist ambitions of the Stuart kings” being replaced by “parliamentary supremacy”).
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augmentation of the Crown’s authority ultimately failed in the seven-
teenth century when parliamentary sovereignty emerged as the prevailing
ideal and political reality.71
Thus, the robust English royal prerogatives that were a feature of the
Stuart Kings’ absolutist designs were already waning in England more
than a century before the Framing. Indeed, there are reasons to doubt the
political reality of the version of the prerogatives popularized by Black-
stone, who described them as “positive substantial parts of the royal char-
acter and authority.”72 Indeed, English legal scholars have long observed
the wide gulf between Blackstone’s idealized theory of the monarchy and
the real King’s powers.73 This disconnect has been described as flowing
from “two different senses in which the word King is employed.”74 One
refers to a theory of the ideal of the King, and the other is a real King
operating in a political reality of shared governance.75
Blackstone referred to the King in the idealized sense, when he theo-
rized that the guardianship prerogative reflected the King as “the foun-
tain of justice, always present in all his courts, the fountain of honor.”76
Indeed, John Allen, writing in the early nineteenth century, recognized
this was a fictionalized King for the theory of monarchy, not the “real
King of the constitution.”77
For purposes of the Sovereignty Transference theory of parens patriae
power in America, the King’s real power at the time of independence is
key, as the theory relies on a premise of actual transference of power.
However, by 1601, Parliament had already taken control of supervision of
charities through legislation.
The next Part will show that the lack of a robust royal prerogative to
supervise charities at the time of the Framing undermines a core premise
of the Sovereignty Transference theory of parens patriae power.
3. The Statute of Elizabeth of 1601 & Parliament’s Supervisory Powers
Given that Parliamentary sovereignty is the first principle of the En-
glish constitutional system, it necessarily follows that Parliament has the
power to take control of matters that once were royal prerogatives. Sir
Edward Coke famously held in the seventeenth century that “the King
71. DICEY, supra note 54, at 245.
72. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *239–40.
73. See, e.g., JOHN ALLEN, INQUIRY INTO THE RISE AND GROWTH OF THE ROYAL
PREROGATIVE IN ENGLAND 34–35 (1849 ed.) (“Blackstone either contradicts himself . . .
or, when he ascribes sovereignty without qualification to the King, he speaks of the ideal
King, who is supposed by a legal fiction to represent and possess the whole power and
authority of the state, and not the real King, who cannot pass a turnpike act without the
advice and consent of his Lords and Commons. The ideal King of the lawyers is a King
above law; the real King of the constitution is a King subject to law.”).
74. Id. at 35.
75. Id.
76. Curtis, supra note 41, at 896; see ALLEN, supra note 73, at 35 (“Perfection is an-
other attribute of royalty, which the lawyers have found a difficulty in transferring from
their own fictitious creation to the real King of the constitution.”).
77. ALLEN, supra note 73, at 35.
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hath no prerogative, but that which the law of the land allows him.”78
Indeed, Sir William Holdsworth asserted that the idea of the primacy of
law over the King’s prerogative was a dominant political idea stretching
all the way back to the Middle Ages.79
Though the royal prerogatives may have been historically “the residue
of discretionary or arbitrary authority,”80 the nature of the prerogative
changed in the seventeenth century. Parliament cut away the royal pre-
rogatives in many areas.81 Indeed, in 1689, the Bill of Rights brought the
idea of royal prerogatives expressly under Parliament’s control by clarify-
ing that “Parliament could amend or revoke any prerogative power.”82
The King also lacked the power to create new prerogatives after this.83 In
other words, the entire universe of potential prerogatives was limited to
those existing before 1689, and tolerated by Parliament.84 Parliament’s
control over the prerogative powers in that era also resulted in the reloca-
tion of those powers from “the Monarch in person to the Monarch’s ad-
visers or ministers”—in the sense that they simply became powers of the
central government, not of the King.85
By the time of the American Revolution, royal prerogatives were thus
already limited. The question thus becomes what royal guardianship pow-
ers existed in 1689 and persisted into the eighteenth century. Long before
1689, the royal prerogative related to charitable trusts had already been
taken over by Parliament. In 1601, Parliament passed an act that went to
the very heart of the King’s duty to care for those who could not care for
themselves. The Statute of Elizabeth of 1601, “An Acte to redresse the
Misemployment of Landes Goodes and Stockes of Money heretofore
given to Charitable Uses.”86 Though this statute has long been the subject
of intensive study by scholars of the law of charities,87 it has been largely
overlooked by modern proponents of Sovereignty Transference and
78. Brigid Hadfield, Judicial Review and the Prerogative Powers of the Crown, in THE
NATURE OF THE CROWN: A LEGAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 197, 198 (Maurice Sunkin et
al. eds., 1999) (quoting Case of Proclamations (1611) 77 Eng. Rep. 1352; 12 Co. Rep. 74,
76).
79. 10 SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 358 (Methuen & Co.
Ltd. 1975) (1903).
80. DICEY, supra note 54, at 282; see also Hadfield, supra note 78, at 200.
81. Hadfield, supra note 78 at 198–99; see also HOLDSWORTH, supra note 79, at 340
(“[T]hough the King was personally above the law, his prerogative was subject to it.”).
82. Hadfield, supra note 78, at 199; HOLDSWORTH, supra note 79, at 361 (“After 1688
it was clear that the prerogative in all its parts was subject to law.”).
83. Hadfield, supra note 78, at 199.
84. See id.
85. Id.
86. Statute of Charitable Uses 1601, 43 Eliz. 1, c 4 (Eng.)
87. See, e.g., JAMES J. FISHMAN, THE FAITHLESS FIDUCIARY AND THE QUEST FOR
CHARITABLE ACCOUNTABILITY 1200–2005 85–87 (2007); James J. Fishman, Charitable Ac-
countability and Reform in Nineteenth-Century England: The Case of the Charity Commis-
sion, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 723, 729 & n.31 (2005); Rupert Sargent Holland, The Modern
Law of Charities as Derived from the Statute of Charitable Uses, 52 AM. L. REG. 201, 203
(1904); Jill R. Horwitz, Nonprofits and Narrative: Piers Plowman, Anthony Trollope, and
Charities Law, 4 MICH. ST. L. REV. 989, 996 (2009).
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scholars of parens patriae, despite the emergence of parens patriae in the
Founding Era in America in charity cases.
The Statute of Elizabeth had enormous significance in the history of
charities in England and America in that it defined the range of accept-
able charitable purposes.88 Colonial law followed these same charitable
purposes.89 It thus had clear substantive dimension. Professor Jill Hor-
witz observed that this statute was in part inspired by Henry VIII’s con-
flict with the church over property rights, worth one-third to one-half of
all the wealth in England.90 Professor James Fishman also documented
the responsiveness of the statute to the economic problems of the 1590s
in which forty percent of the English population could not maintain basic
subsistence, malnutrition was rampant, and property crimes were escalat-
ing.91 Meanwhile, efforts to provide relief for the poor were unpopular
and met stiff resistance.92
The Statute of Elizabeth was part of a package of “poor law legisla-
tion” from 1597 to 1601 that sought to respond to the economic and social
crisis.93 The statutory scheme was designed to encourage and facilitate
private philanthropy to benefit the poor.94 These “poor laws” persisted in
England without meaningful change until 1834.95
A core feature of the Statute of Elizabeth was the creation of a system
of legal accountability for charitable gifts.96 This was responsive to a pop-
ular perception that trustees of charitable organizations often swindled
donors.97 This perception probably had its roots in Henry VIII’s dissolu-
tion of church monasteries in the 1530s, based on alleged ecclesiastical
misuse of charitable assets,98 and the subsequent attempts by patrons to
reclaim their past donations to the church.99 In this environment, even
after the Reformation, complaints to the chancellor (who acted on the
King’s behalf) often went unremedied, as the Chancery typically failed to
offer any relief to claimants, responding instead with jurisdictional objec-
tions.100 Indeed, Professor Fishman contends that before 1597, there was
no adequate procedure in the Chancery for the Crown to protect charita-
ble assets, and endless judicial delays were common.101 Worse, under the
English system, a charity beneficiary petitioning for relief could have
88. Horwitz, supra note 87, at 996.
89. Id. at 1001.
90. Id. at 995.
91. FISHMAN, supra note 87, at 86.
92. Id. at 86, 97.
93. Id. at 87, 94, 96.
94. Id. at 88–89.
95. Id. at 87.
96. Id. at 99–100.
97. Id. at 100–01.
98. Fishman, supra note 87, at 29–30.
99. Id. at 30. Fishman describes accounts of “forcible seizure” of such donations, rang-
ing from a widow retrieving a cow, to cities making large expropriations. Id.
100. FISHMAN, supra note 87, at 99–100 (describing hyper-technical procedural objec-
tions that doomed such claims and prevented relief).
101. Id. at 100.
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been forced to pay legal costs if the claim was unsuccessful, resulting in
financial ruin.102
Prior to the Statute of Elizabeth, the King’s agents thus effected little
actual guardianship with regard to charity supervision, despite whatever
residual, historical royal prerogatives may have theoretically existed. The
royal prerogative and beneficence that existed in Blackstone’s ideal the-
ory of the monarchy probably rarely protected real victims of misman-
aged or plundered charities. This was the social context for Parliament’s
creation of a new oversight scheme to ensure effective charitable supervi-
sion so that the public would have confidence that donations would be
used for their intended purpose.103
The statute created new procedures to investigate theft or misuse of
assets and clarified the chancellor’s role.104 These new procedures in-
cluded the appointment of commissioners to investigate improper use of
assets.105 The preamble also enumerated the permissible charitable uses
under the statute’s ambit, focusing particularly on relief of poverty.106 Im-
portantly, the statute also gave direction to the chancellor about enforc-
ing and reforming bequests.107
Parliament’s exercise of power over the supervision of charities makes
it impossible to treat such supervision as a pure royal prerogative by the
time of the Revolution. Indeed, even Blackstone is understood to have
defined prerogatives as exclusive and unique to the Crown, not shared
with Parliament.108 Once a power became authorized by, defined by, and
controlled by Parliament, it ceased to be a true “prerogative.”109
By 1601, any historical royal prerogative regarding charities had be-
come constrained by a statutory scheme. In other words, charitable su-
pervision became a creature of parliamentary control, no longer
possessed by the Crown alone. By the time of the American Revolution,
any sovereign “guardianship power” over charities thus had statutory
constraints. Charitable supervision thus cannot properly be considered a
true prerogative after this period.110 There was therefore no true royal
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 101.
105. Holland, supra note 87, at 203.
106. FISHMAN, supra note 87, at 102; Horwitz, supra note 86, at 999.
107. Trs. of Phila. Baptist Ass’n v. Hart’s Ex’rs, 17 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1819).
108. Sir William Wade, The Crown, Ministers and Officials: Legal Status and Liability,
in THE NATURE OF THE CROWN, A LEGAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 23, 30 (Maurice
Sunkin et al. eds., 1999) (“Blackstone pointed out that ‘prerogative’ power should, prop-
erly speaking, mean power which is unique to the Crown—for example, the power of par-
don, the power to create a peer and the power to summon and dissolve Parliament—as
distinct from powers which the Crown shares with its subjects . . . . But the courts lost sight
of this distinction and took to using ‘prerogative’ indiscriminately for any act of the Crown
that was not authorised by statute.”).
109. See id.
110. Id. (discussing Blackstone’s definition of a royal prerogative as meaning “power
which is unique to the Crown” and not shared).
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prerogative to transfer in this area at the time of American
Independence.
This history makes the Sovereignty Transference theory untenable be-
cause charitable supervision was the core area of parens patriae litigation
in early eighteenth century America. The next Part will show that the
Framing generation understood the relationship between Parliament and
the Crown and the importance of Acts of Parliament being received (or
rejected) by the new states. Indeed, there was considerable disagreement
about the effect of English legislation about charities in the new states in
the early years of the Republic—and that disagreement meaningfully im-
pacted the American understanding of the states’ parens patriae power in
the decades that followed. This disagreement manifested in a stunning
reversal by the Supreme Court on the effect of one of those “received”
Acts of Parliament with regard to the parens patriae power.111
4. The American States’ Reception of the English Statute of Elizabeth
Prior to the American Revolution, colonial law already recognized
many of the charitable uses defined by the Statute of Elizabeth.112 After
Independence, the statute was recognized by six states, and was re-en-
acted by two more.113 Pennsylvania additionally recognized “principles
that properly emanate from it,” without actually adopting it.114 Neverthe-
less, it was eventually repealed or rejected by twelve states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia.115 Reception of any uniform American parens patriae
power through the statute would thus be impossible to establish, given
the statute’s widespread rejection by various states.
In 1819, this problem of inconsistent reception reached the U.S. Su-
preme Court when a case came out of Virginia, a state that expressly
repealed the Statute of Elizabeth. Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion con-
sidered the exercise of parens patriae power of the new American states
in the context of the enforcement of charitable bequests.116 The case con-
cerned a will made in Virginia in 1790, bequeathing property to perpetu-
ally fund the education of Baptist youths in Philadelphia interested in
becoming ministers.117 Two years after the will was created, the Virginia
Legislature repealed all English statutes, including the Statute of Eliza-
111. Trs. of Phila. Baptist Ass’n v. Hart’s Ex’rs, 17 U.S. 1, 47–50 (1819), overruled by
Vidal v. Girard’s Ex’rs, 43 U.S. 127, 192–96 (1844).
112. Horwitz, supra note 86, at 1001.
113. Holland, supra note 87, at 207 (listing Maine, Massachusetts, Illinois, Kentucky,
Missouri, and North Carolina as recognizing the Statute of Elizabeth, while Connecticut
and Rhode Island re-enacted it).
114. Id. (quoting Wright v. Linn, 9 Pa. 433, 435 (1848)); see also Miller v. Porter, 53 Pa.
292, 299 (1866); Gardner, supra note 44, at 899–900.
115. Holland, supra note 87, at 207 (listing California, Delaware, the District of Colum-
bia, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, New York, New Jersey, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia, as rejecting the Statute of Elizabeth); Gardner,
supra note 44, at 900 (listing the same states).
116. Phila. Baptist Ass’n, 17 U.S. at 2.
117. Id. at 2–3.
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beth.118 Shortly thereafter, the testator died.119 The informal Baptist As-
sociation in Philadelphia had not yet incorporated, so the estate’s
executor refused to convey the property because, at the time of the testa-
tor’s death, the individuals who composed the association were not le-
gally authorized to collect and the association itself had no legal
existence.120 Without a lawful beneficiary, the bequest technically failed,
and the question was whether the bequest could be reformed by the state
using the state’s parens patriae power.121
As an initial matter, the opinion identified the state attorney general as
the proper party to take up any residual parens patriae power.122 It ob-
served that the practice of the attorney general filing an information
“might very well grow out of [the royal] prerogative” to supervise charita-
ble uses.123 For this reason, the opinion required the attorney general to
be made a party.124 This mechanical observation had monumental impor-
tance for the development of an American form of parens patriae doc-
trine—it designated state attorneys general as the proper parties to assert
parens patriae power.
Chief Justice Marshall approached the problem regarding the Statute
of Elizabeth in Virginia by looking at the Chancery’s power in England
over charitable devises.125 He concluded that the English case law estab-
lished that “bequests are void, independent of the [Statute of Elizabeth],
and good under it.”126 In other words, the power of the Chancery to en-
force vague or indefinite bequests depended on the statutory power.127
Since Virginia had repealed the Statute of Elizabeth, the petitioner ar-
gued that the Court could reform the will by exercising the prerogative of
the King as parens patriae that had existed before the Statute of Eliza-
beth.128 Such an approach would have simply pretended Parliament had
never passed the statute, by looking at the Crown’s power before the stat-
ute’s enactment. In other words, it would have arrogated to Virginia
power that had not actually existed in England since 1601. Without re-
marking on the contra-factual nature of the request, the Court found no
cases supporting that power, and indeed, observed that while such power
existed under the Civil Law in European nations, England had not
adopted any civil code on charitable devises and had many rules at odds
with civilian principles.129 Indeed, Justice Marshall found ample support
118. Id. at 2.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 2–3, 28.
121. Id. at 2.
122. Phila. Baptist Ass’n, 17 U.S. at 39.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 50.
125. Id. at 32–33.
126. Id. at 33.
127. Id. at 43.
128. Phila. Baptist Ass’n, 17 U.S. at 3–4, 43.
129. Id. at 43–44; see also id. at 46 (“[T]he doctrines of the court of chancery, peculiar
to charities, originated not in the civil law, but in the statute of Elizabeth.”).
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in English cases for a conclusion that the Chancery understood its power
to supervise charitable bequests as defined and limited by the statute.130
While acknowledging that some form of royal prerogative had existed
to enforce charities “in very early times,” the boundaries of that preroga-
tive were lost in the mist of time prior to the Statute of Elizabeth.131
Justice Marshall thus read Blackstone’s description of the King’s broad
power over charities as being historical and theoretical.132
Justice Marshall appears to have understood that whatever power the
King may have had in ancient times became bounded by statute once
Parliament acted.133 The prerogative power had already become statu-
tory through Parliament’s enactment of the Statute of Elizabeth. This
Framing Era understanding undermines a key premise of the Sovereignty
Transference theory.134 At least from an Originalist perspective, Sover-
eignty Transference fails.
This conclusion is strengthened by another case, decided a few years
later in 1830, in which a concurrence observed the correctness of Baptist
Association’s understanding of the statute.135 Justice Johnson went even
further, observing that “[t]he plain object of the act of 43 Eliz. is to place
in commission a troublesome branch of the royal prerogative . . . .”136 The
Statute of Elizabeth had “swallowed up” the royal prerogative.137 Thus,
the chancellor’s own authority thereafter flowed from the statute, not
from the royal prerogative.138
Johnson was not alone in agreeing with Marshall. Justice Story revealed
in 1830 that he too had been satisfied with Marshall’s opinion in the Bap-
tist Association case.139 As Part II.B explains, Justice Story later changed
his mind and eventually wrote an opinion overruling Baptist Association.
His opinion inaugurated a new era of parens patriae power based on
130. Id. at 45 (discussing Morice v. The Bishop of Durham, 9 Ves. 399, aff’d 10 Ves.
540); id. at 46 (“[T]he chancellor says, ‘it is the duty of the trustees, or of the crown, to
apply the money to charity, in the sense which the determinations have affixed to the word
in this court: viz., either such charitable purposes as are expressed in the statute, or to
purposes analogous to those.’”).
131. Id. at 47.
132. Phila. Baptist Ass’n, 17 U.S. at 48–50.
133. Id. at 48–49 (“This superintending power of the Crown, therefore, over charities,
must be confined to those which are valid in law.”).
134. The opinion also made an important point by observing that even if some hypo-
thetical powers of the king might have transferred independent of the statute, exercising
them would requires the state’s attorney general to be a party. Id. at 50. As Virginia’s
attorney general was not joined, there was no possibility of even considering the matter. Id.
at 50.
135. Inglis v. Trs. of Sailor’s Snug Harbour, 28 U.S. 99, 139 (1830) (Johnson, J., concur-
ring) (“The correctness of the decision of this court therefore in the Baptist Association
case cannot, I think, be disputed.”).
136. Id.
137. Id. (“This controlling power being absolute and final, soon swallowed up its par-
ent, and became original and absolute.”).
138. Id. (“[N]o other authority for its exercise has ever been claimed by the chancellor
but the 43d Elizabeth.”).
139. Id. at 149–50 (Story, J., concurring).
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common law alone,140 which eventually led to a “general law of chari-
ties.” The Supreme Court’s reversal planted the seed for current confu-
sion over the source of the parens patriae power.
B. THE UNIVERSAL SOVEREIGNTY THEORY OF AMERICAN
PARENS PATRIAE POWER
In the mid-nineteenth century, a different historical narrative emerged
from the Supreme Court to justify parens patriae power in the American
states. It appeared just as the federal general law was expanding in the
Swift v. Tyson era,141 and it was in fact closely related to the general law.
This alternative theory eventually derived parens patriae power from uni-
versal principles of sovereignty. Under the new theory, the power flowed
not from prerogatives of the English Crown, but rather from universal
principles about what it means to be a functioning government.
Following a mode of reasoning remarkably similar to the derivation of
the federal general law of negotiable instruments deduced in Swift, the
Court in this era eventually looked to Roman law and history to derive
“general principles” of state power to explain parens patriae powers of
American states.142
1. Rejecting the Statute of Elizabeth in Favor of Common Law to
Justify American State Power over Charities
The American states’ supervisory powers over charities reached the Su-
preme Court again in 1844.143 This is precisely the same subject in which
Blackstone had posited that a theoretical royal prerogative existed, but
Justice Marshall had found depended on an act of Parliament in Baptist
Association; however, Justice Story chose to approach the matter
differently.144
Vidal v. Girard’s Executor involved a massive fortune devised to the
city of Philadelphia.145 A very wealthy citizen of Philadelphia bequeathed
a fortune to the city to (among other things) improve a neighborhood in
140. Vidal v. Girard’s Ex’rs, et al., 43 U.S. 127, 192–95 (1853).
141. 41 U.S. 1, 19 (1842) (developing a federal common law of contracts and commer-
cial transactions based on “general principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence”).
142. See id. (“The law respecting negotiable instruments may be truly declared in the
languages of Cicero, adopted by Lord MANSFIELD in Luke v. Lyde, 2 Burr. 883, 887, to be
in a great measure, not the law of a single country only, but of the commercial world. Non
erit alia lex Romae, alia Athenis; alia nunc, alia posthac; sed et apud omnes gentes, et omni
tempore una eademque lex obtinebit.”).
143. See Vidal, 43 U.S. at 127–128.
144. Id. at 192–93.
145. Id. at 128–29. The case loosely implicated the English Statutes of Mortmain, elev-
enth-century statutes that once prevented land from passing into the possession of the
Church or religious corporations. See id. at 144–45. They came to be understood as pre-
cluding estates from passing to corporations without royal assent. See id. Nevertheless,
Philadelphia’s charter allowed it to take ownership of real and personal property by devise,
as the relevant English statute was not in effect. Id. at 185–87.
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order to promote the health of its citizens,146 found a college,147 and edu-
cate orphans.148 The testator identified the mayor, aldermen, and citizens
of Philadelphia as beneficiaries.149 The fortune was so enormous that the
Pennsylvania Legislature passed an act in 1832 specifically to enable the
city to accept the bequest.150 The testator’s heirs then sued to invalidate
the bequest.151 They argued the bequest was void.152
The heirs made two important arguments for the failure of the bequest:
(1) the city’s representatives were incapable of legally executing the pur-
ported trust or holding the property for the benefit of others, and (2) the
trust’s charitable purposes and beneficiaries were too indefinite under the
common law of Pennsylvania.153 The Statute of Elizabeth was not in ef-
fect in Pennsylvania, as had been true of Virginia in Baptist Associa-
tion.154 Story acknowledged that, in Baptist Association, Justice Marshall
had found no English common law authority to establish the legal entity
necessary to further the testator’s intentions, where the case involved a
donation to a trustee who lacked legal capacity to take the property and
indefinite beneficiaries.155 Nevertheless, the Court in Vidal reached the
opposite result and upheld the lower court’s decision to allow the state to
establish the charitable trusts in Pennsylvania.156 In other words, Penn-
sylvania had the power that Virginia lacked, though it too had not re-
ceived the Statute of Elizabeth. The difference for the Court was not state
law, but rather a reinterpretation of English legal history.
Relying on an English case in which the Court of Chancery had re-
viewed a charitable bequest for a school and upheld the charitable use,
Justice Story’s opinion declared that it was clear that the Chancery had
the power to create and enforce charities (and charitable trusts) even
where the Statute of Elizabeth did not extend to the use.157 From this, he
concluded that there was a common law power in the Chancery that was
independent of the statute.158 He relied on the “dicta of eminent [Chan-
cery] judges” to conclude that “charitable uses might be enforced in chan-
cery upon the general jurisdiction of the court, independently of the
statute of 43 of Elizabeth.”159 Justice Story then concluded that the stat-
ute was purely jurisdictional, creating commissions to oversee charities,
146. Id. at 129.
147. Id. at 130.
148. Vidal, 43 U.S. at 129, 132.
149. Id. at 129.
150. Id. at 138, 190–91.
151. Id. at 139–43.
152. Id. at 143, 186.
153. Id. at 192–93.
154. Vidal, 43 U.S. at 192. The Court concluded that the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania had rejected the statute for procedural reason, but it acknowledged the statute’s
list of charitable uses, as well as others that had been supported in chancery before the
statute, were recognized in Pennsylvania. Id.
155. Id. at 192–93.
156. Id. at 201–02.
157. Id. at 193.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 194.
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without creating “new law” or altering parens patriae power of the
King.160 Thus, the state could use parens patriae powers to ensure the
property went to the intended charitable use.
In Justice Story’s view, English common law parens patriae power ex-
isted separately from the Statute of Elizabeth, so it was as though the
statute never existed. This view is antithetical to the English constitu-
tional value of parliamentary sovereignty and erroneously treats the com-
mon law as being on equal footing with parliamentary acts. It is also
undercut by historical work by charities scholars regarding the abject fail-
ures of the Chancery in the area of charity supervision and the historical
reasons why Parliament chose to constrain equitable discretion and cod-
ify the subject. Finally, the opinion perhaps accepted the Chancery’s own
self-serving pronouncements of its own power viz-a-viz Parliament, de-
spite historical allegations that English equity subverted the rule of law
and caused cases to turn on the length of the chancellor’s foot.161
Justice Story also overlooked the fact that the English common law on
point was irrelevant. Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court in 1827 had declared
that, “by force of our own common law,” relief of the sort requested here
could be given because its common law adopted the “principles” of the
statute, as applied by the Chancery.162 Pennsylvania’s courts had them-
selves recognized that the Chancery “applied” the legislative principles
from Parliament. Story’s musing about English common law, that may or
may not have existed before the statute’s passage, was nothing more than
irrelevant dicta, as far as the state’s own courts were concerned, since
Pennsylvania’s own common law applied the principles of the Statute of
Elizabeth.
Given that Justice Story was also the author of Swift v. Tyson (another
case disregarding state common law in favor of the Supreme Court’s own
derivation of law),163 the disregard for a state supreme court’s judicial
pronouncements on the content of its own state common law in Vidal
seems emblematic of Justice Story’s broader legal philosophy (an archaic
Supreme Court approach that met its end in Erie Railroad Company v.
Tompkins).164
Read from a modern perspective, the case should have turned on
Pennsylvania’s own common law as a foundation for the state’s power to
160. Vidal, 43 U.S. at 194–95.
161. See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, “Cardozo’s Foot”: The Chancellor’s Conscience and
Constructive Trusts, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 7 (1993) (quoting John Selden’s articu-
lation of the “Chancellor’s foot”).
162. See Witman v. Lex, 17 Serg. & Rawle 88, 88 (Pa. 1827) (emphasis added) (“The
statute 43 Eliz. ch. 4, of charitable uses, is not extended to Pennsylvania, but still the princi-
ples of it, as applied by chancery, in England, obtain here, by force of our own common
law, and relief will be given so far as the power of the courts will enable them.”); see also
Miller v. Porter, 53 Pa. 292, 299 (1866) (“[T]his [S]tatute [of Elizabeth] was not extended to
Pennsylvania, though its principles have been often recognised and declared to be part of
our common law.”).
163. See generally 41 U.S. 1, 9 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64, 79–80 (1938).
164. See 304 U.S. 64, 79–80 (1938).
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create charitable trusts.165 This key legal difference distinguished Penn-
sylvania in Vidal from Virginia in Baptist Association. Pennsylvania’s
common law recognizing its own state power thus distinguished the case
from Baptist Association, where Virginia had repealed the Statute of Eliz-
abeth but had not yet replaced it with common law of its own (or a legis-
lative enactment) that would have created an alternative source of
positive power.
The confusion Justice Story sowed with his frolic into old English
Chancery cases that preceded the Statute of Elizabeth opened the door
for a much bolder move on the part of the Supreme Court a few decades
later. By claiming the Chancery had independent, inherent powers sepa-
rate from the statute, Justice Story had mistakenly hinted that this power
might have an existence that Parliament could not affect. As explained in
the next Part, this became the seed for the Universal Sovereignty theory
of parens patriae.
2. Inherent, Universal State Power as a Source Parens Patriae Doctrine
In 1890, the Supreme Court applied the parens patriae doctrine to re-
solve a dispute over the ownership of land belonging to the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, seized by the United States in order to
enforce a federal polygamy statute in the Utah territory.166 As the prop-
erty had been held by the corporation for charitable uses, the Court in-
voked “those principles of reason and public policy which prevail in all
civilized and enlightened communities” to justify the federal govern-
ment’s oversight of those charitable purposes.167 In so doing, it relied on
the government’s parens patriae power to oversee charities. The court
made no distinction between the prior cases which had focused exclu-
sively on the parens patriae power of the states and this case involving the
power of the federal government.
The Court reasoned that this power to oversee charities “prevail[ed] in
all civilized countries pervaded by the spirit of Christianity,” and then
traced these principles from Roman law through Continental Europe to
England.168 The Court’s historical account began with the third century,
in the Pandects of Justinian, referring to the government’s power as
parens patriae to oversee the disposition of charitable property for a par-
165. See Witman, 17 Serg. & Rawle at 88 (“The statute 43 Eliz. ch. 4, of charitable uses,
is not extended to Pennsylvania, but still the principles of it, as applied by chancery, in
England, obtain here, by force of our own common law, and relief will be given so far as
the power of the courts will enable them.”).
166. Late Corp. of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136
U.S. 1, 8–9 (1890). The U.S. Attorney General sought to seize a vast amount of real and
personal property held by the church’s corporate trustee (as the church had been incorpo-
rated under Utah law). Id. at 9. Upon the death of the church’s trustee, the government
asserted there was “no person lawfully authorized to take charge of, manage, preserve, or
control said property,” so it sought to appoint a receiver to hold the property of the corpo-
ration and wind up the corporation’s affairs. Id. at 10.
167. Id. at 50–51.
168. Id. at 51–56.
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ticular use as property given to the public.169 Tracing instances of the doc-
trine through the French and Spanish Civil Codes, the Court found the
same principles were widely used in England by the seventeenth cen-
tury.170 It concluded the power was nothing more than the “ordinary
power of the court of chancery over trusts, and in part from the right of
the government or sovereign, as parens patriae, to supervise the acts of
public and charitable institutions in the interest of those to be benefited
[sic] by their establishment . . . .”171
The Latter-Day Saints opinion became foundational to modern Ameri-
can parens patriae doctrine, appearing at a critical moment when the doc-
trine was about to begin expanding. It departs from earlier attempts to
connect the doctrine to English statutory or common law,172 claiming in-
stead a much more venerable—and universal—history. This purported
universal history is critical, as the Court was engaging in a very specific
kind of reasoning: it was deriving a general law of charities from the es-
sence of sovereignty (i.e., what it means to be a government).
The opinion’s broad language is emblematic of nineteenth century de-
claratory legal philosophy, invoking general, universal principles and cus-
toms to “find” common law.173 The many historical instances the Court
cited were described as mere “indicia of the general principle underlying
them.”174 This statement reveals that the application of the parens patriae
doctrine here was a reflection of general principles which the Court called
“a general law of charities.”175 This “doctrine of charities” that it had
derived from universal principles of sovereignty was then applied in the
Utah territory.176
The Court’s language echoes similar language used in opinions describ-
ing the federal general law of Swift v. Tyson, though it had no specific
connection to that body of mercantile common law. The federal general
law was abolished in 1938 as a constitutional matter in Erie Railroad
Company v. Tompkins.177 There is little left of the old federal general law
(including any “general law of charities”). Erie returned that body of sub-
stantive law to the states, as a constitutional matter.178 Thus, a federal
169. Id. at 52 (discussing instances of the doctrine under Roman law).
170. Id. at 52–56.
171. Id. at 56.
172. See, e.g., Curtis, supra note 41, at 895–96; Ratliff, supra note 13, at 1850.
173. See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW
1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 121 (1992) (discussing late-nineteenth cen-
tury invocation of custom as a standard of justice); id. at 202–03 (discussing the “discovery”
and “finding” metaphors of nineteenth century classical legal thinking).
174. Latter-Day Saints, 136 U.S. at 51.
175. Id. at 61–62 (“Coming to the case before us, we have no doubt that the general law
of charities which we have described is applicable thereto.”) (emphasis added); id. at 63
(“The foregoing considerations place it beyond doubt that the general law of charities, as
understood and administered in our Anglo-American system of laws, was and is applicable
to the case now under consideration.”) (emphasis added).
176. Id. at 61–62.
177. 304 U.S. 64, 79–80 (1938).
178. Id.
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common law power to declare the parens patriae power of the state attor-
neys general cannot be grounded in pre-Erie notions rooted in the federal
general law, or the values that spawned that body of law.
The general law of charities invoked in Latter-Day Saints had another
dimension apart from the federal common law it purported to create. It
contained a powerful narrative about the fundamental power of states:
the Court concluded that parens patriae power is intrinsic to the nature of
government “whether that power is lodged in a royal person, or in the
legislature.”179 It reasoned this power is essential to protect “the interests
of humanity” and avoid “injury to those who cannot protect them-
selves.”180 In other words, states (and the federal government) have the
power by virtue of their mere existence—and federal courts had the right
to declare that power.181
Three justices dissented from this view of inherent power, observing
that Congress possesses only a limited, not inherent, power in our consti-
tutional system.182 Despite the obviousness of Article I’s structural limita-
tions, their critique had little traction in the years that followed. Instead,
the Universal Sovereignty narrative, rooted in Roman law and the prac-
tices of European monarchies, was deemed to have been transmitted to
America through England. The Supreme Court had reified the monarchi-
cal royal prerogative into an inherent, extra-constitutional power of the
federal government—without regard to the purpose of the American
Revolution or the constitutional objectives of the Framing Era.183
The nineteenth century principles embedded within Latter-Day Saints
resurfaced in modern cases in other substantive areas, as recently as 1982.
For example, Latter-Day Saints was cited with approval in Alfred A.
Snapp & Sons v. Puerto Rico, a modern leading case on parens patriae
power, in an employment discrimination case brought by Puerto Rico on
179. Latter-Day Saints, 136 U.S. at 57.
180. Id.
181. The Court also invoked the Sovereignty Transference theory, reaching back to the
power of the English king and reasoned that the “beneficent function” of the King as
protector survived the American Revolution and became vested in the new nation’s gov-
ernmental entities—particularly the legislature and its judiciary. Id. at 58–59 (“The state,
by its legislature or its judiciary, interposes to preserve [charity funds] from dissipation and
destruction, and to set them up on a new basis of usefulness, directed to lawful ends, coin-
cident, as far as may be, with the objects originally proposed.”); id. at 60 (“By the Revolu-
tion, the state of Vermont succeeded to all the rights of the crown as to the unappropriated
as well as appropriated glebes.”) (quoting Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 13 U.S. 292, 334–35
(1815)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court took it as self-evident that whatever
intrinsic power the King had as guardian of the realm transferred to the states, and Con-
gress, in the new federal system. Id. at 56–57. It thus connected to the Sovereignty Trans-
ference theory of parens patriae power. Id.
182. Id. at 67–68 (Fuller, J., dissenting).
183. By contrast, in this same era, Justice Holmes, while on the bench of the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts, understood the irreconcilable contradiction between the power of
the old monarchies and the American Revolution. See In re Mun. Suffrage to Women, 36
N.E. 488, 492 (Mass. 1894) (J. Holmes) (“Hobbes urged his motion in the interest of the
absolute power of King Charles I., and one of the objects of the constitution of Massachu-
setts was to deny it.”).
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behalf of its citizen workers.184
The rationale of Latter-Day Saints remained influential well into the
modern expansive era of the doctrine. It has cast a very large shadow
over modern mass tort litigation, despite its roots in a form of federal
common law that no longer exists.
Universal Sovereignty deserves to be interred as a justification for
parens patriae in the modern era, along with the rest of Swift’s progeny,
at least in so far as it reflects a federal common law doctrine purporting to
define the state’s own powers and duties over a substantive area constitu-
tionally assigned to the state (i.e., charitable bequests). Resting upon the
rotten foundation of an imaginary federal general law of charities, such
federal common law lacks any coherence in the post-Erie era. This is not
to say, however, that a state’s own common law is similarly constrained:
state common law can evolve through any set of principles fitting to the
state’s own jurisprudence. Indeed, state common law was one of the earli-
est legal sources of parens patriae power in the Framing Era.185
The universal principles of charity governance that gave rise to the fed-
eral common law doctrine of parens patriae vanished as a constitutional
matter in 1938. Without those principles, the “inherent powers” that are
derived from ancient experience vanish, and the federal common law
they created crumbles. Instead, we are left with a constitutional system in
which Congress has limited powers, states make the substantive laws of
charities (by statute or by common law), and federal courts are out of the
business of finding universal principles to declare state substantive com-
mon law.
Moreover, the Universal Sovereignty theory’s birth in a case about fed-
eral parens patriae power makes the theory dubious as an explanation for
the development of that doctrine as it relates to state power. It obfuscates
the difference between the limited constitutional power of the federal
government and the residual power of the state governments.
Unlike the Sovereignty Transference theory, the Universal Sovereignty
theory was not widely replicated in subsequent cases, though Latter-Day
Saints has been cited with approval in the modern era. Part III will ex-
plore the manner in which the shaky historical foundations of parens pa-
triae power morphed into the foundation for modern multi-billion mass
tort litigation, repackaging the old Sovereignty Transference notion.
III. MASS TORTS & THE MODERN QUASI-SOVEREIGNTY
THEORY OF AMERICAN PARENS PATRIAE POWER
In the late-nineteenth century, the parens patriae doctrine began its
evolution from power over charities toward all-purpose “guardianship
power.” A decade after Latter-Day Saints, in Louisiana v. Texas, a case
invoking the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, parens patriae was in-
184. 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982).
185. See discussion supra note 165 and accompanying text.
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voked in a new context.186 In 1899, Texas enacted quarantine regulations
to prevent the spread of yellow fever and placed an embargo on all inter-
state commerce between the city of New Orleans and the state of Texas—
blocking the flow goods and people from the Port of New Orleans, which
was then one of the nation’s largest ports.187 Texas stationed armed
guards to prevent goods produced in New Orleans from crossing the bor-
der.188 Apparently, only one isolated case of yellow fever had been re-
ported, and people in Louisiana suspected the Texans were using the
quarantine as a ruse to steal shipping traffic from New Orleans for the
benefit of the port of Galveston.189
Louisiana sued as parens patriae to enjoin the Texas embargo, asserting
a role as “trustee, guardian, or representative of all her citizens.”190 The
Court interpreted the state’s cause of action to be an assertion that the
state was empowered to seek relief on behalf of its citizens, rather than a
cause of action asserting a special injury to the state itself.191 As such, it
declined to extend the Court’s original jurisdiction, as the case presented
no controversy between the states themselves.192 An injury to Louisiana’s
citizens alone was insufficient for purposes of the Court’s original juris-
diction.193 However, the opinion broke new ground by implicitly recog-
nizing Louisiana’s sovereign interest in the dispute affecting its citizens—
an interest later cases denominated a “quasi-sovereign” interest.194
Louisiana’s sovereign interest here was not a version of the royal pre-
rogative (which focused on the king as guardian to a limited class of vul-
nerable subjects). It was something entirely new in the area of economic
torts. This novel use of parens patriae expanded far beyond the guardian-
ship notions described in the early charity cases. It quickly replicated it-
self in other cases.
A. THE EMERGENCE OF THE QUASI-SOVEREIGN THEORY IN
ENVIRONMENTAL SUITS IN THE EARLY
TWENTIETH CENTURY
The early 1900s were a time of enormous importance for the develop-
ment of modern parens patriae doctrine.195 Professors Ieyoub and Eisen-
berg opine that the development of the doctrine closely traced American
186. See generally Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 19 (1900) (“[T]he state of Louisiana
presents herself in the attitude of parens patri[a]e, trustee, guardian, or representative of
all her citizens.”); see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (conferring jurisdiction over “Con-
troversies between two or more States . . . .”).
187. Louisiana, 176 U.S. at 3–5.
188. Malina & Blechman, supra note 14, at 204.
189. Id.
190. Louisiana, 176 U.S. at 19.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 22.
194. Ratliff, supra note 8, at 1851.
195. Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 1879 (“Most of the leading Supreme Court
cases date from the early 1900s.”).
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industrialization—the state guardianship power reached air and water
pollution just as those matters were issues of public importance in this era
of rapid industrialization.196
Professor Thomas Lee has persuasively argued that the emergence of
state-as-plaintiff suits in the post-bellum period was closely connected to
the influence of the doctrine of espousal in international law.197 Espousal
in international law allowed an aggrieved foreigner’s government to
adopt the foreigner’s private legal claim (such as a debt) and advance that
claim in his stead, typically through diplomatic action or international ju-
dicial proceedings.198 In other words, the foreign government would
stand in as the plaintiff for its citizen, in a legal proceeding asserting
rights belonging to that citizen. However, the foreign government had the
power to use whatever means it chose to enforce this claim of its citizen,
“including the waging of war, regardless of the provision of a private judi-
cial remedy in the American national courts.”199 This power was under-
stood to be a function of sovereignty.200 Professor Lee points out that the
espousal doctrine has deep historical roots, going back to the Framing
Era,201 and that it forcefully re-emerged at the end of the nineteenth and
the beginning of the twentieth centuries.202 However, the Supreme Court
in that era rejected the doctrine of espousal between American states in
New Hampshire v. Louisiana.203 The Court held that espousal rights be-
long only to nations and the American states surrendered them to the
federal government.204 Lee contends that the constitutional grant of orig-
inal jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in state vs. state controversies was
a substitute for espousal rights.205
Professor Lee suggested that parens patriae power (in which a state
sues to vindicate claims for a class of its citizens) is a “weaker, domestic
cousin” of espousal rights under international law.206 Indeed, the demise
of espousal power for the states in 1872 seems to have ushered in the rise
of parens patriae as a separate, distinct doctrine in the decades that fol-
lowed. The temporal connection suggests that parens patriae became a
substitute for espousal.
196. Id.
197. Thomas H. Lee, The Supreme Court of the United States as Quasi-International
Tribunal: Reclaiming the Court’s Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction over Treaty-Based
Suits by Foreign States Against States, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1765, 1862–66 (2004).
198. Id. at 1855.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1857.
201. Id. at 1858 (discussing Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 429 (1793) (Iredell, J.)).
202. Lee, supra note 197, at 1855–56.
203. Id. at 1858 & n.403 (discussing New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 91
(1883)); 1863 (observing that New Hampshire would have had a claim of espousal under
international law against Louisiana in 1872 for the nonpayment of debts owed to New
Hampshire citizens, but that the American states had no such espousal rights against one
another).
204. Id. at 1863.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1855 n.393.
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Consistent with this theory, there is a second, related potential causal
trigger for the rise of the new breed of parens patriae in the late-nine-
teenth century: the expansion of state police powers.207 For example, just
one year after recognizing Louisiana’s interest in opposing a quarantine
affecting its citizens, the Court expanded the concept of legitimate state
interests in Missouri v. Illinois to include environmental torts.208 Missouri
filed a bill of complaint asserting the Court’s original jurisdiction in a
dispute with Illinois over pollution of the Mississippi river.209 The suit’s
gravamen was public nuisance.210
Illinois had allowed Chicago to construct a canal to send virtually all its
sewage to the Des Plaines River, which emptied into the Illinois River,
and ultimately into the Mississippi River.211 Missouri complained that
this new sewage plan would make it the recipient of 1,500 tons per day of
Chicago’s filth, including industrial waste from stock yards, distilleries,
and manufacturing industries, all of which would otherwise have flowed
into Lake Michigan.212 Illinois would thereby have allegedly poisoned the
drinking water for Missouri’s own communities.213
The Court concluded that Missouri had the power to sue to protect the
health and welfare of its citizens, and indeed an adequate remedy could
only be found through such a parens patriae suit.214 It found the state to
be the “proper party” to represent its inhabitants when those inhabitants’
health and welfare was threatened.215 It likened Missouri to a sovereign
nation that would have the right to seek redress through negotiation or
ultimately war to protect its citizens. As the several states have neither
diplomatic nor war-making powers in our constitutional system, the
Court reasoned that its own original jurisdiction must be the constitu-
tional solution.216
The Court thus was not relying on any royal prerogative to sue.217
Rather, the state’s power to sue was instead treated as a substitute in our
federal system for a different kind of sovereign right any nation-state
would have had. This was thus a revision of the Universal Sovereignty
theory: instead of inheriting specific prerogatives from England, the
207. See HORWITZ, supra note 173, at 27 (“By the 1870s, police power had become the
standard legal category for talking about the state’s regulatory power over health, safety,
and morals of its citizens.”).
208. 180 U.S. 208, 248 (1901).
209. Id. at 209.
210. Id. at 214.
211. Id. at 211.
212. Id. at 212.
213. 180 U.S. at 212–13.
214. Id. at 241.
215. Id.
216. Id. The Court limited Louisiana v. Texas to its peculiar facts—causing Justice
Fuller, who wrote that opinion, to dissent from the result in Missouri. See id. at 249 (Fuller,
J., dissenting).
217. See Malina & Blechman, supra note 14, at 202 (“The significant point is that, de-
spite the reliance of several States on the precedents we have discussed, the law governing
the royal prerogative of the English King has no bearing on our problem.”).
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states impliedly had different, unique powers that were analogs to the
powers of sovereign nations, transformed to comport with constitutional
limits.
This transition is crucial to understanding the failure of the Sovereignty
Transference narrative as a foundation for American parens patriae
power: according to Blackstone, public nuisance could be nothing more
than a delegation of the individual’s right to abate a nuisance.218 How-
ever, these nineteenth century American courts understood the exercise
of state’s own police power in these suits to grounded upon a common
law of nuisance, and the nuisance was a public right.219 As historian Mor-
ton Horwitz explained, in police power cases in the 1870s, “the law of
nuisance provided the categories for determining when it was legitimate
for the state to regulate on behalf of the health, safety, and morals of its
citizens.”220 These categories became the boundaries of parens patriae
authority for the state to sue in that era.
Over the next two decades, a state’s “quasi-sovereign” power to sue to
protect its environment on behalf of its citizens was upheld in other con-
texts, including diverting stream water,221 cross-border air pollution from
an industrial plant,222 natural gas,223 and drainage of waterways.224 Pro-
fessor Lee’s research has shown a significant increase in such state-as-
plaintiff cases involving the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction in this
era between 1870–1919 (in which the Supreme Court issued forty-nine
such dispositions), whereas there had only been six in the twenty-five-
year period preceding the Civil War.225
The suits also soon escaped from the murky confines of original juris-
diction, with states beginning to sue private out-of-state tortfeasors. In
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Company, Georgia sued a foreign corpora-
tion allegedly discharging noxious gases into Georgia from a plant in Ten-
nessee.226 Justice Holmes found that the discharge implicated Georgia’s
quasi-sovereign capacity because there was a state interest “independent
of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its
domain.”227 A distinction had thus fully emerged between the interests of
citizens affected within a state and the state’s own public interest in the
welfare of its citizens collectively.228
The distinction between citizen interests and sovereign interests was
important for the Court’s original jurisdiction, though not necessarily for
218. HORWITZ, supra note 173, at 27–28 (citing 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTA-
RIES *219).
219. Id. at 27–28.
220. Id. at 28.
221. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 46 (1907).
222. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 236 (1907).
223. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 581 (1923).
224. North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 371 (1923).
225. Lee, supra note 197, at 1870.
226. 206 U.S. at 236.
227. Id. at 237.
228. Malina & Blechman, supra note 14, at 206, 207.
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other cases in the lower courts. Parens patriae became part of the Court’s
original jurisdiction out of necessity, in order to allow states to protect the
general welfare—where they had no other constitutional means of doing
so.229 Individual interests could be protected through individual suits so
there is no argument of necessity supporting original jurisdiction in mass
torts,230 but nor was there an argument forbidding it in lower courts.
State suits on behalf of the interests of citizens instead were eventually
justified through the expansive quasi-sovereignty theory of parens
patriae.
By this point in the doctrine’s development, there could be no possible
claim that this authority to sue to protect the environment derived from
any English doctrine of royal prerogatives, or even universal, inherent
powers generally found in ancient European history. The research of
Professors Woolhandler and Collins has demonstrated that there was no
state power at common law to bring federal public nuisance suits on be-
half of citizens as opposed to those suits brought on behalf of the state’s
own particular injury.231 The evolution of the parens patriae power in
public nuisance suits thus cannot be connected to any transferred power
from England, or even universal sovereignty rights. It was a new feature
of the American system.
At the dawn of the twentieth century, parens patriae was no longer
tethered to any historical antecedents in England, medieval Europe, or
ancient Rome. It was sui generis in America, a quasi-sovereign right im-
plied by the constitutional structure. This branch of the doctrine appears
to be properly understood as an offshoot of Universal Sovereignty
through the right of espousal in international law (commencing from the
premise that all sovereign nations have the power to go to war to protect
their interests from incursions), translated through the lens of the emerg-
ing state police powers to morph it into a new, different kind of power in
the American federalist structure.
Nevertheless, as will be seen in the next Part, the modern doctrine con-
tinued to be mired in the false history of Sovereignty Transference.
B. THE MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY EXPANSION OF THE
QUASI-SOVEREIGNTY THEORY
By the mid-twentieth century, the public guardianship notion expanded
to encompass states’ assertion of antitrust and related price-fixing
claims.232 Indeed, just as air and water pollution were issues of public
interest during the early industrial period of the early 1900s, price-fixing
229. Id. at 209.
230. Id.
231. Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387,
432–33, 474 (1995) (observing the nuisance and water rights suits deviated from common
law but operated “squarely within the area of health, safety, and welfare encompassed by
even limited views of state regulatory power”); see also HORWITZ, supra note 173, at 27–28
(citing 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *219).
232. Georgia v. Pa. R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 443–44 (1945).
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and market manipulations became a regulatory focus for the consumer
state in the mid-twentieth century—particularly following criminal price-
fixing convictions in the electrical equipment industry in 1961.233
In the late 1960s, several states attempted to bring treble-damages anti-
trust claims either on behalf of citizen-consumers, based on purported
injuries to the whole economy of the state.234 The most important of
these was an antitrust action by Hawaii against Standard Oil, “on behalf
of consumers” and for alleged injury to the state’s economy and prosper-
ity.235 It included a class action claim, as well as a parens patriae claim.236
The case reached the Supreme Court, forcing the Court to evaluate the
quasi-sovereignty doctrine in the context of market injury.
The case offers an important example of a state relying purely on a
common law form of parens patriae power to seek damages and injunc-
tive relief in antitrust.237 The Court allowed the state to seek injunctive
relief, but not damages on behalf of its citizens.238 The Court vaguely
invoked the Sovereignty Transference theory, based on the parens patriae
doctrine’s alleged “deriv[ation]from the English constitutional sys-
tem.”239 In so doing, it shored up what has now become the modern my-
thology of American parens patriae doctrine: the states acting as quasi-
sovereign heirs of the English King’s duty to act as guardian of the whole
realm, without any hint that any of the King’s representatives ever en-
gaged in mass-tort litigation.240 An alleged prerogative to supervise chari-
ties (later constrained by Parliament), here morphed into mass-tort
litigation, conferring a false historical pedigree that never really existed.
The Court again bypassed the opportunity to examine the history of
transference during the Framing Era. It overlooked the complex history
of the charity cases discussing what statutory or common law powers
were actually received. It instead replicated the mythological origin from
nineteenth century cases. Modern U.S. courts continue to assert that, in
the absence of a royal person to serve as parens patriae, states in our
federal system “received” the guardian function of the King.241
233. See Malina & Blechman, supra note 14, at 193 (discussing “the avalanche of litiga-
tion” that followed the convictions).
234. Id. at 193–94 & n.7 (cataloging cases filed by Hawaii, Michigan, California, Kansas,
New Jersey, Illinois, and New York in 1969).
235. Id. at 196 (quoting Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 301 F. Supp. 980, 984 n.4 (D. Ha-
waii 1969)).
236. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 255 (1972).
237. Cox, supra note 8, at 2329–30.
238. Id. Professor Cox observes that Congress responded to the decision by amending
the Clayton Act, “to authorize state attorneys general to ‘bring a civil action in the name of
such State, as parens patriae on behalf of natural persons residing in such State. . .to secure
monetary relief.’” Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 15c (2012)).
239. Standard Oil, 405 U.S. at 257.
240. See id.
241. Id.; accord California v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 474 F.2d 774, 776 (9th Cir. 1973) (“It is
true that in the United States this royal prerogative function of the king has passed to the
states.”).
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In this way, courts treat quasi-sovereignty in parens patriae doctrine as
a modern, fictionalized reworking of the Sovereignty Transference the-
ory.242 In Standard Oil, the Court correctly recognized that parens patriae
had morphed in American courts far beyond any historical application in
eighteenth century England.243 It did not, however, recognize that this
morphed quasi-sovereign power has nothing whatsoever to do with
whatever royal prerogative may have once existed in England prior to the
Statute of Elizabeth—or question why any sovereign power over charities
would imply a power to bring mass-tort litigation of all varieties.
By the mid-twentieth century, Louisiana v. Texas had been reinter-
preted by the Court to stand for the proposition that parens patriae suits
on behalf of a state’s citizens are a proper state function.244 A state’s right
to sue as parens patriae to protect its quasi-sovereign interest had become
an unquestionable feature of statehood, though the Court struggled with
whether any particular injury at issue was compensable to the state itself,
as opposed to the citizens.245
Despite its historical trappings, the modern American parens patriae
doctrine appears to have virtually no genuine connection to any royal
prerogative.246 Indeed, in Alfred L. Snapp & Sons v. Puerto Rico in 1982,
the Court finally seemed to concede that the English power of the Crown
at common law is disconnected from the modern American applications
of parens patriae.247 The Court nevertheless asserted that the sovereignty
narrative still has force through “a ‘quasi-sovereign’ interest, which is a
judicial construct that does not lend itself to a simple or exact defini-
tion.”248 This is the closest the Court has come to admitting that the
early-twentieth century cases had invented the historical foundation of
quasi-sovereignty narrative and its historical antecedents are a fiction.
The historical mythology nevertheless persists in the lower courts.249
The idea of the quasi-sovereign interest is difficult to separate from its
historical mythology: it is supposed to reflect the interest a sovereign
power (king) would have had, made quasi only because the states are not
truly sovereign in our constitutional federal system. Stripped of the his-
torical trappings related to the guardianship of charities, infants, idiots,
242. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600
(1982) (“This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every
State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature . . . . “).
243. See Standard Oil, 405 U.S. at 257.
244. Id. at 258–59.
245. Id.
246. See Curtis, supra note 41, at 907–08 (noting that when acting in a quasi-sovereign
capacity, a state’s purpose is the protection of the well-being of its entire populace and its
economy, not just the protection of a dependent class).
247. 458 U.S. at 600 (“This common-law approach [the King’s prerogative], however,
has relatively little to do with the concept of parens patriae standing that has developed in
American law.”).
248. Id. at 601.
249. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 536 F.3d 418, 425 (5th Cir.
2008) (discussing the King’s royal prerogative in an antitrust suit while concluding the doc-
trine has “expanded considerably”).
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and lunatics, the problem becomes defining the remaining content of the
quasi-sovereignty.
Ultimately, the Court pointed out that the quasi-sovereign interest to
litigate runs parallel to the state’s interest in legislation: the state’s power
to sue is determined, at least in part, by “whether the injury [to the health
and welfare of its citizens] is one that the State, if it could, would likely
attempt to address through its sovereign lawmaking powers.”250 The
state’s amorphous interest includes “the health and well-being—both
physical and economic—of its residents in general,” as well as an interest
“in not being discriminatorily denied its rightful status within the federal
system.”251
The nature of the state’s quasi-sovereign interest concept has con-
founded courts attempting to distinguish permissible state interests from
impermissible citizen interests. This has drawn criticism from scholars and
practitioners.252 The recognition of a public interest distinct from the pri-
vate citizen one, though, is precisely what separates the American parens
patriae from the doctrine known to Blackstone—this is the uniquely
American feature of parens patriae that could not have been inherited
from England.253
Parens patriae actions have become commonplace features of mass tort
litigation, especially in consumer protection and antitrust cases.254 The
past decade has experienced an explosion of litigation brought by state
250. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607.
251. Id.
252. Lemos, supra note 9, at 492–93 (describing the “fuzzy line” between forms of
parens patriae litigation); Ratliff, supra note 8, at 1851 (“‘Quasi-sovereign’ is one of those
loopy concepts that comes along often enough to remind us that appellate courts some-
times lose their moorings and drift off into the ether. It is a meaningless term absolutely
bereft of utility.”); id. at 1852 (discussing the “blurry” outline of quasi-sovereignty); id. at
1857 (concluding that the doctrine is “too vague to permit any predictability”); Malina &
Blechman, supra note 14, at 214 (describing state parens patriae actions under this doctrine
as “Robin Hoods” who are “misled by the ambiguity of the term ‘parens patriae’ and are
propounding a legal theory based on a confusion of the disparate notions of the royal
prerogative and quasi-sovereignty”); Jim Ryan & Don R. Sampen, Suing on Behalf of the
State: A Parens Patriae Primer, 86 ILL. B.J. 684, 687 (1998) (“There is clearly tension, if not
outright inconsistency, among some of the cases allowing and disallowing individual relief
in parens patriae suits.”); Curtis, supra note 41, at 914 (describing the confusion regarding
American precedent discussing quasi-sovereign interests).
253. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
254. See, e.g., Beth Farmer, More Lessons from the Laboratories: Cy Pres Distributions
in Parens Patriae Antitrust Actions Brought by State Attorneys General, 68 FORDHAM L.
REV. 361, 362–64 (1999) (describing broad range of parens patriae antitrust suits involving
automobiles, automotive products, food processors, real estate, milk, consumer electronics,
footwear, toys, cemetery plots, petroleum products, garbage carting, and cable television
services); Jay L. Himes, State Parens Patriae Authority: The State Attorney General’s Au-
thority, INST. FOR LAW & ECON. POLICY SYMPOSIUM 12–14 (2004), https://web.archive.org/
web/20160203081715/http://apps.americanbar.org/antitrust/at-committees/at-state/pdf/pub-
lications/other-pubs/parens.pdf; see generally Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics
Corp., 134 S. Ct. 736 (2014) (antitrust); California ex rel. Lockyer v. Safeway, Inc., 371 F.
Supp. 2d 1179 (2005), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, remanded sub. nom. to 651 F.3d 1118 (9th
Cir. 2011) (antitrust); Nevada v. Bank of America Corp., 672 F.3d 661 (9th Cir. 2012)
(consumer fraud); California v. General Motors LLC, 69 F. Supp. 3d 404 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(vehicle ignition defects); Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit, New Mexico v. Volk-
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attorneys general on behalf of consumers, dramatically affecting the na-
ture of product regulation.255 Parens patriae litigation has become rou-
tine in environmental protection, and even civil rights enforcement.256
All of these forms of parens patriae actions now frequently obtain money
damages awards as well as injunctive relief—making it quite clear that
parens patriae is no longer a creature of equity (deriving its legitimacy
from the historical power of Court of Chancery in England).257
While states now sue as plaintiffs to enforce more varied forms of pub-
lic rights than they did in the nineteenth century, they also continue to
use the power to bring actions for public nuisance that echo the kinds of
claims brought in the post-bellum period. For example, on June 20, 2016,
New Mexico sued Colorado, invoking the Supreme Court’s original juris-
diction, for a public nuisance claim based on a major spill of toxic fluid
from the Gold King Mine in southwestern Colorado into the Animas
River.258 The spill allegedly sent 880,000 pounds of arsenic, lead, cad-
mium, copper, mercury, and zine, and three million gallons of mine was-
tewater into the waterway, where it then flowed into northern New
Mexico, fouling drinking water.259 The state alleges the spill will cause
long-term health risks to its own citizens, including farmers, ranchers, and
recreational users of the river, and harm the river’s ecosystem.260 It ex-
pressly includes a public nuisance claim, along with other statutory
claims.261 This suit is very much in the tradition of the post-bellum parens
patriae public nuisance cases. It is also consistent with the modern trend
of seeking both equitable relief and monetary damages.262
This modern version of the old-fashioned public nuisance parens pa-
triae litigation can be contrasted with a different breed of modern litiga-
tion having no nineteenth-century analog: consumer litigation brought by
state attorneys general against private defendants for economic injuries
to citizens. For example, states sued several book publishers and Apple
swagen Group of America, Inc., No. 3:16-CV-03007, 2016 WL 4059280 (N.D. Cal. July 5,
2016) (vehicle emissions litigation).
255. Gifford, supra note 29, at 914.
256. Himes, supra note 254, at 13 & n.66 (discussing state authority to sue under federal
anti-discrimination statutes).
257. Id. at 13–14 & n.67 (the “state’s interest in preventing harm to its citizens by anti-
trust violations is, indeed, a prime instance of the interest that the parens patriae can vindi-
cate by obtaining damages and/or an injunction”) (discussing e.g., Insurance Antitrust
Litigation, 938 F.2d 919, 927 (9th Cir. 1991, aff ‘d in part, rev’d in part sub. nom. Hartford
Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S.764 (1993)); Maine v. M/V Tamano, 357 F. Supp. 1097,
1101-02 (D. Me. 1973) (recovering damages for environmental injury); Selma Pressure
Treating Co., v. Osmose Wood Preserving Co. of America, Inc., 221 Cal. App. 3d 1601, 271
Cal. Rptr. 596, 606 (1990) (affirming right to pursue money damages award)).
258. Motion for Leave to File Bill of Complaint, Bill of Complaint, and Brief in Sup-
port of Motion for Leave to File Complaint at 1–2, New Mexico v. Colorado, No. 22O147
ORG (2016), https://www.env.nm.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/160604-for-filing.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UUA7-ZKER].
259. Id. at 2.
260. Id. at 3.
261. Id. at 45–48.
262. See id. at 51 (seeking compensatory, consequential, and punitive damages, as well
as equitable relief).
796 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69
over electronic book price manipulation in 2013, obtaining over $500 mil-
lion in settlements for the benefit of consumers.263 A new litigation regu-
latory structure has emerged from a patchwork of settlements with
manufacturers, and sometimes entire industries, in the wake of parens
patriae actions.264 Such suits have transformed regulation of products as
disparate as cigarettes, firearms, automobiles, consumer goods, and phar-
maceutical drugs.265 State quasi-sovereign interests built a new business
regulatory system based on mass tort litigation.
What began in Louisiana v. Texas as an inquiry into the Supreme
Court’s original jurisdiction in a dispute between two states has evolved
into an all-purpose state power used to sue private defendants for mass
tort claims, even aggregating the claims of individual victims.266
C. THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY “ALL PURPOSE” STATE POWER TO
LITIGATE MASS TORT CLAIMS ON BEHALF OF CITIZENS
By 2000, scholars had observed that state and federal courts “uniformly
recognize a state’s authority to sue, as parens patriae, to vindicate the
state’s and its citizens’ interests.”267 This was the result of rapid evolution
of the doctrine toward the end of the twentieth century.
Parens patriae went through a remarkable transformation in the multi-
state tobacco litigation in the 1990s, in which many states brought novel
tort claims to sue cigarette manufacturers for harm to the common good,
through aggregated harm to their citizen smokers resulting in increased
health costs for the states themselves.268 In this model, the physical harm
that was sustained by the smokers then transmitted to the state through
financial costs.269
Causation requirements often make recovery for individual victims of
products like cigarettes impossible—indeed, individual plaintiffs lost vir-
tually every personal injury case brought against tobacco companies prior
to the states’ parens patriae litigation.270 The states were fairly successful
suing to recover financial costs incurred from smokers’ addiction though.
Professors Ieyoub and Eisenberg have argued that the states’ involve-
ment in tobacco litigation turned the tide against the defendants, result-
ing in the first plaintiff-verdicts in California, Oregon, and Florida.271
263. See Albanese, supra note 15; Hood, supra note 16.
264. Gifford, supra note 29, at 914–15.
265. Id.; see also id. at 930 (“Regulatory litigation is an attempt on the part of the state
attorney general to expand the boundaries of the common law with the explicit purpose of
regulating an industry . . . .”).
266. See id. at 931.
267. Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 1864.
268. Gifford, supra note 29, at 931–32.
269. Id. at 932–33.
270. Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 1860 (“Before the states’ [parens patriae]
litigation, the tobacco industry had not lost a smoking case . . . .”); id. at 1860 n.1 (“Plain-
tiffs previously had won only two trials of 813 filed claims against tobacco companies, with
the two trial victories reversed on appeal.”).
271. Id. at 1860.
2016] Parens Patriae and The States’ Historic Police Power 797
This highlights that states have been able to win recoveries through
parens patriae that individual citizens often could not win on their
own.272 This is true even in the absence of statutory authority for the
parens patriae power: lower courts continue to rely instead on the com-
mon law sovereignty narrative articulated by the Supreme Court when
statutory authority fails.
For example, in Texas v. American Tobacco Company, the district
court understood the Supreme Court’s sovereignty narrative to create a
common law right for states to bring suit to protect their quasi-sovereign
interests.273 The state sued the cigarette maker for strict products liability,
breach of warranty, negligence, fraud, and misrepresentation.274 Uncon-
strained by the mythological royal prerogative, the district court reasoned
that these quasi-sovereign interests “evolve and change with time,” per-
mitting a case-by-case definition of the scope of those interests.275 The
only limit this lower court perceived was that states could not use this
power as mere nominal parties asserting interests belonging to someone
else.276
Parens patriae is now operating unfettered by any constraints related
to its mythological historical origin. A purely judicial construct, state in-
terests can apparently now be anything courts deem worth protecting.
Nevertheless, the false historical trappings continue to be invoked to con-
fer legitimacy to the concept, even when they lack any meaningful con-
nection to it.277
Against this tide, there has been a stream of resistance to this common
law expansion of parens patriae authority. In the early 1970s, for exam-
ple, the Ninth Circuit rejected permitting a state to bring an antitrust suit
based on such common law in California v. Frito-Lay.278 The court rea-
soned that legislation authorizing a state to sue as a plaintiff was essential
to expand the limited historical reach of the parens patriae doctrine at
common law.279 In other words, expansion required a source of positive
law. Although not noticed by the lower court, this notion impliedly re-
flects the old spirit of Marshall’s opinion in Baptist Association, looking
for a source of positive law for the power. It is, however, entirely out-of-
step with the common law development of the parens patriae doctrine in
272. See id.; see also Gifford, supra note 29, at 933.
273. 14 F. Supp. 2d 956, 962–63 (E.D. Tex. 1997).
274. Id. at 965.
275. Id. at 962 (“It is without question that these interests can evolve and change with
time, and as such, the Court made very clear its desire to maintain a definition that is
conducive to a case-by-case analysis.”).
276. Id.
277. See, e.g., id. at 962–63 (“It is clear to the Court that the State can maintain this
action pursuant to its quasi-sovereign interests found at common law.”) (emphasis added).
278. 474 F.2d 774, 777–78 (9th Cir. 1973).
279. Id. at 777. In the wake of the Ninth Circuit’s rejection of the state’s power to bring
an antitrust claim on behalf of its citizens, Congress amended the Clayton Act to expressly
permit parens patriae actions. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-499, at 6–8 (1975), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2572, 2575–78; Texas v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 709 F.2d 1024, 1025 & n.1 (5th
Cir. 1983) (discussing legislative history).
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the post-bellum period.280
More recently, the Fifth Circuit questioned Louisiana’s quasi-sovereign
interest in a parens patriae suit against insurers who allegedly manipu-
lated the state’s insurance market to inflate premiums after Hurricane
Katrina.281 The insurers disputed Louisiana’s quasi-sovereign interest.282
The state’s standing to sue was not at issue in the case, as the only dispute
before the court was the removability of the suit to federal court under
the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA).283 The court analyzed removabil-
ity through the lens of the quasi-sovereignty narrative in Snapp.284 As the
Fifth Circuit concluded the state was only a nominal party to the insur-
ance litigation, with the policyholders as the real parties in interest, it
treated the matter as aggregate litigation presenting claims of the citizens
themselves, not any quasi-sovereign interest of the state.285 Other circuits
disagreed with this approach, refusing to convert parens patriae actions
into aggregate litigation with the citizens as real parties in interest.286 Ul-
timately, the CAFA question was settled in 2014 by the Supreme Court,
which unanimously held parens patriae actions are not removable under
CAFA as “mass actions.”287 The Court, however, based its analysis on
CAFA’s jurisdictional language, not the nature of parens patriae (and
had nothing to say about the state’s quasi-sovereign interest in the
case).288
One scholarly approach suggests that a proper understanding of the
quasi-sovereign interest paradigm results in a conclusion that “the state’s
interest may be parasitic on the interests of individual citizens.”289 In
other words, a state can sue in its parens patriae capacity to redress pri-
vate interests that are widespread enough to implicate the state’s interest
in the welfare of its citizens.290 This principle has maximum force where
the individual harms may otherwise go unredressed.291 Indeed, the core
precedent defining the doctrine from the turn of the century illustrated
the problem during the industrialization of the economy: regional pollu-
280. See discussion supra Part II.A.
281. See Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 536 F.3d 418, 422–23 (5th Cir.
2008), overruled by Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 134 S. Ct. 736 (2014).
282. Id. at 425–26.
283. Id. at 423.
284. Id. at 425–26 (quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458
U.S. 592, 600 (1982)).
285. Id. at 428–29.
286. See Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Kentucky, 704 F.3d 208, 209 (2d Cir. 2013); LG Display
Co., Ltd. v. Madigan, 665 F.3d 768, 773–74 (7th Cir. 2011).
287. Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 134 S. Ct. 736, 745–46 (2014).
(reversing Fifth Circuit’s mode of analysis).
288. See id. As Professor Lemos has aptly observed, the nominal party issue has no
relevance to the parens patriae question. Lemos, supra note 9, at 495 n.38. It is pertinent to
subject matter jurisdiction in federal court (for purposes of original jurisdiction and diver-
sity jurisdiction), and thus goes to where the suit may be brought, not whether the state has
the power to bring it at all. Id.
289. Lemos, supra note 9, at 494.
290. Id. at 495.
291. See Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 1874, 1880.
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tion and rights to clean air and waterways could not have been ade-
quately redressed on an individual level, even though individuals might
have had private claims.292 The parens patriae litigation from that era
reflected state attempts to regulate these widespread, regional effects in
the absence of action from Congress.293 The fulcrum of these suits has
shifted in the modern era to markets, particularly consumer markets,
which are often themselves regional or even national,294 as reflected by
the modern tactic of banding together multiple states as joint plaintiffs to
pursue such litigation.295
Many state statutes now make the state’s interest explicit by authoriz-
ing attorneys general to sue on behalf of state citizens for particular
torts.296 For example, California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) is typ-
ical in that it expressly contemplates enforcement by the Attorney Gen-
eral bringing suit on behalf of injured citizens for, among other things,
false advertising and fraudulent business practices.297 However, the states
have not approached such statutory authority uniformly.298
These statutes often implicate the state’s standing to assert the claims
of citizens, but the federal courts have sometimes treated standing to
bring parens patriae suits as a question of prudential standing (meaning
not of constitutional magnitude, such that limits are open to revision by
Congress).299 This appears to be no longer viable, in light of the Supreme
Court’s recent retreat from prudential standing.300 Moreover, where
292. Id. at 1879.
293. Id.
294. See id.
295. Id. at 1881–82 (discussing thirty-nine states acting jointly in litigation against the
tobacco industry).
296. Lemos, supra note 9, at 495–96.
297. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17204 (conferring power to bring suit for injunc-
tive relief); see also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16760 (conferring parens patriae authority
to sue for monetary relief for injuries sustained by the people of California).
298. As of 2002, in multidistrict litigation involving suits by all fifty states, one district
court observed that forty-two states and the District of Columbia have some form of
parens patriae power:
Fourteen . . . states—California, Colorado, Delaware, the District of Colum-
bia, Hawaii, Idaho, Massachusetts, Nevada, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Utah, and West Virginia—have expressly conferred parens
patriae authority. Sixteen states—Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Kansas,
Maryland, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming—have
express statutory authority to represent consumers in a capacity which is the
functional equivalent of parens patriae. Thirteen states—Alabama, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New
Jersey, New Mexico, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington—have had state and/
or federal courts interpret statutory provisions to effectively grant parens pa-
triae authority or have determined that their attorney general has such au-
thority under state common law.
In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 205 F.R.D. 369, 386–87 (D.D.C. 2002)
(citations omitted). The other eight states can apparently bring representative suits on be-
half of their citizens under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Id. at 387.
299. Lemos, supra note 9, at 497 & nn.42–43.
300. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1377, 1381–82
(2014).
800 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69
there is a federal statute conferring such authority (such as the Clayton
Act), Congress has already spoken and named state attorneys general as
proper parties to bring suit under that statute. In the absence of such a
federal statute, however, the common law parens patriae doctrine (with
its sovereignty narrative) has traditionally filled in the gap.
There appears to be little meaningful difference in the doctrine be-
tween state and federal courts. Indeed, state courts appear to have appro-
priated the quasi-sovereignty narrative, with its historical mythology.301
Part IV offers an alternative narrative to explain the American devel-
opment of the doctrine based on the states’ historic police powers.
IV. EXCAVATING AN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
FOUNDATION FOR THE STATES’
PARENS PATRIAE POWER
Although the Supreme Court has conceded the contours of parens pa-
triae common law authority are judge-made, cases legitimize the doctrine
by invoking the mythology of the royal prerogative, allegedly transmitted
to the states following the American Revolution.302 As explained in Parts
II and III, the historical narratives ultimately fail to account for the mod-
ern form of the doctrine. This Part reconstructs the doctrine independent
of any royal prerogatives or ancient European traditions. It argues the
parens patriae power is best understood with reference to the evolution
of the states’ historic police powers in the American constitutional
structure.
The expansion of parens patriae in the late-nineteenth century reflects
the expansion of state police powers: they move in tandem, with parens
patriae mirroring then-extent views of police powers. Stripped of the sov-
ereignty narratives connecting parens patriae with powers of the Crown
at common law, the doctrine can be reconstructed as a direct reflection of
evolving understandings of the state’s police powers in our constitutional
system. States possess the power to sue to enforce norms within the
sphere of their police powers, and as the substantive police powers
evolved, so did their related parens patriae powers.
A. OVERVIEW OF THE STATES’ POLICE POWERS
It is axiomatic that our constitutional structure contains a sphere of
authority where Congress has declined to impose federal lawmaking
power, even where Article I might allow it to do so. In this unclaimed
area of governance, the states have residual power.303 This space exists in
301. See Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 13, 1864 (“Parens patriae doctrine in the
United States generally follows the same principles in federal and state courts. State court
cases discussing parens patriae regularly rely on federal precedents. Federal doctrine is
therefore a natural starting place for describing the parens patriae doctrine.”).
302. See supra notes 238–239 and accompanying text.
303. See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 387 (1798) (“It appears to me a self-evident
proposition, that the several State Legislatures retain all the powers of legislation, dele-
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the gaps between federal lawmaking, where “[s]tates [have] great latitude
under their police powers to legislate as to the protection of the lives,
limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons.”304
Soon after the Framing, the Court recognized that some state legisla-
tion might be “contrary to the great first principles of the social com-
pact,” and thus not merit being called a “law” at all.305 These first
principles included the people of the United States creating their consti-
tutions and forms of government “to establish justice, to promote the
general welfare, to secure the blessings of liberty; and to protect their
persons and property from violence.”306 These purposes, according to
Justice Chase, determine the terms of the social compact and the founda-
tion of legislative power.307
In the early years of the Republic, there was scant Supreme Court con-
cern with state legislation largely because the Marshall Court had
shielded state legislation from rigorous review under the Bill of Rights,
leaving the states relatively free to legislate.308 The Court’s jurisprudence
on police powers thus took many decades to emerge. Our constitutional
jurisprudence developing the concept of the state’s historic police powers
finally coalesced in the middle nineteenth century.309
According to Professor Morton Horwitz, prior to the 1850s, “jurists did
not generally derive the regulatory powers of the state over health, safety,
and morals from notions of inherent state power.”310 This changed
quickly between 1850–1870,311 about the same time the Universal Sover-
eignty theory emerged in the parens patriae context.312 Horwitz observed
that “[b]y the 1870s, police power had become the standard legal cate-
gated to them by the State Constitutions; which are not EXPRESSLY taken away by the
Constitution of the United States. The establishing courts of justice, the appointment of
Judges, and the making regulations for the administration of justice, within each State,
according to its laws, on all subjects not entrusted to the Federal Government, appears to
me to be the peculiar and exclusive province, and duty of the State Legislatures . . . .”); see
also Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L.
REV. 1321, 1326 (2001); Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L.
REv. 1349, 1385 (2001); Margaret S. Thomas, Constraining the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure Through the Federalism Canons of Statutory Interpretation, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL’Y 187, 236–37 (2013).
304. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 270 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
305. Calder, 3 U.S. at 388.
306. Id.
307. Id. The social compact premise that was fundamental to the Framing era reveals a
fatal flaw in the sovereignty narrative of parens patriae precedent: the states did not inherit
royal prerogatives or guardianship roles of any King; rather, the people through the state
and federal constitutions, conferred power to govern. The people were the ultimate source
of power, not the Crown. See id. at 387. The source of the parens patriae power thus has to
flow from the constitutional structures created through this social compact. See id. at
387–88.
308. Howard Gillman, The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise of Lochner Era
Police Powers Jurisprudence 48–49 (1993).
309. Id. at 46–47; HORWITZ, supra note 173, at 27 (discussing the emergence of the
concept of state police powers in the 1850s).
310. HORWITZ, supra note 173, at 27.
311. Id.
312. See discussion supra Part II.B.
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gory for talking about the state’s regulatory power over the health, safety,
and morals of its citizens.”313 Initially, the concepts for these early police
powers derived from common law concepts of nuisance.314 That changed
around the turn of the century, as the police power concept matured. Part
IV.B will show that as the understanding of police powers evolved, so too
did the parens patriae litigation.
B. PARENS PATRIAE AS A MANIFESTATION OF THE STATE’S
HISTORIC POLICE POWERS
The canon of state-as-plaintiff cases from the early twentieth century is
a virtually perfect mirror of the then-extant legal understandings of the
states’ police powers. Rather than reflecting some imaginary English pre-
rogative of the king regarding charities that was received at the time of
the Revolution, all of the cases demonstrate examples of state police
powers firmly rooted in our constitutional federalism, at particular mo-
ments of social history.
This linkage can be illustrated by re-examining the emergence of state
involvement in mass tort litigation in the early twentieth century. Com-
mencing with Louisiana v. Texas in 1900, a state attempted to defend its
own economy against an embargo of commerce and travel.315 Georgia v.
Tennessee Copper, a suit about a copper plant’s discharge of sulfuric acid
from a smoke stack flowing into Georgia, shows a state protecting public
health and welfare against poisonous fumes.316 Missouri v. Illinois, a dis-
pute over Chicago’s discharge of sewage down-river, similarly emphasizes
a state’s power to protect the health and welfare of its people.317
In this era, a judicial constitutional construct emerged that focused on
the relationship between states and their polity: state police powers de-
pended upon articulation of a “relat[ionship] to the welfare of the com-
munity as a whole,” rather than advancement of “purely ‘private’
interests.”318 In 1904, Professor Ernst Freund articulated the nature of
this power, as it had evolved in the cases, in two key aspects: the state
police power “aims directly to secure and promote the public welfare,
and it does so by restraint and compulsion.”319 He reasoned that the
power was elastic in that it reflects social, economic, and political condi-
tions.320 Maintaining minimal standards of physical well-being was under-
313. HORWITZ, supra note 173, at 27; see also GILLMAN, supra note 308, at 49 (“An
exercise of legislative powers would be considered valid only if it could reasonably be justi-
fied as contributing to the general welfare.”).
314. HORWITZ, supra note 173, at 27–28.
315. 176 U.S. 1, 2, 4 (1900).
316. 206 U.S. 230, 236 (1907).
317. 180 U.S. 208, 211–12, 214 (1901).
318. GILLMAN, supra note 308, at 49, 55 (observing this doctrine was already well en-
trenched in the nation’s courts by the time of the Civil War).
319. ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS 3 (1904).
320. See id. at 3, 7 (summarizing the primary social interests at stake as including safety,
order, morals, economic interests, and non-material and political interests).
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stood to be a core element of the public welfare.321 This kind of police
power vested in the states as a fundamental duty of government.322
Professor Freund identified a related duty within the police powers to
care for fundamental social interests, particularly “the care and control of
dependent classes, especially of minors.”323 This aspect of the state’s po-
lice powers obviously echoes the ancient royal prerogative to care for
“infants, idiots, and lunatics” in the sovereignty theory of parens patriae
authority.324 The location of this duty of guardianship in the state’s his-
toric police powers hints at the direct relationship between parens pa-
triae, in all its manifestations, and those police powers in our
constitutional system.
Other historic police powers foreshadow the controversial growth of
parens patriae. For example, Professor Freund further identified a contro-
versy surrounding the extension of the state’s police powers to protect
economic interests.325 Writing in 1904, almost contemporaneously with
the dawn of the Lochner era, he concluded that government intervention
to exercise “care and control of economic interests” would be a form of
“favoritism or oppression.”326 A year later, the Supreme Court decided
Lochner v. New York, striking down New York’s law limiting bakers to
ten hours of work per day.327 The Court rejected the state’s argument
that the law protected the health of the bakers (a core function of the
state’s historic police power) and famously concluded the law was an “un-
reasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the right [and lib-
erty] of the individual to [contract].”328 Freund’s skepticism of economic
intervention in his discussion of police powers in the treatise was thus
sensitive to the emerging zeitgeist. Foreshadowing Lochner, Freund ar-
gued that “the idea of due process is freely applied to legislation, and
means with regard to it conformity to the settled maxims of free
government.”329
Against the economic tampering on behalf of favored classes, he distin-
guished other less controversial forms of police power over economic in-
321. Id. at 7.
322. THOMAS MCINTYRE COOLEY & VICTOR H. LANE, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE
AMERICAN UNION 831 (7th ed., 1903) (observing the police power “has been left with the
individual States”); id. at 837 (describing the police power as being limited to the regula-
tion of “comfort, safety, or welfare of society”).
323. FREUND, supra note 319, at 7.
324. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *47.
325. FREUND, supra note 319, at 8 (“That the organized community should afford its
members protection against physical danger and moral scandal, is generally admitted, and
only the question to what extent this protection should go, is controverted. It is otherwise
as to economic interests.”); accord COOLEY & LANE, supra note 322, at 856 (describing the
distinction between lawful police regulation and “interference with commerce” as “exceed-
ingly dim and shadowy”).
326. FREUND, supra note 319, at 8.
327. 198 U.S. 45, 64–65 (1905).
328. Id. at 56.
329. FREUND, supra note 319, at 14 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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terests.330 The wave of parens patriae suits in the early twentieth century
to combat out-of-state air and water pollution fouling areas within state
borders fit comfortably within even the most restrictive view of police
powers of the Lochner era.331 These were classic “health, safety, and wel-
fare” matters at the core of the state’s police powers.332
That era’s embrace of the state’s role protecting public health, safety,
and welfare became the foundation for modern health-related parens pa-
triae suits, like the states’ tobacco litigation, propelling the doctrine far
beyond common law public nuisance. In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, in
1905,333 the Supreme Court upheld a state’s compulsory vaccination
law.334 Jacobson was the doctrinal ancestor of tobacco parens patriae
suits in the 1990s by states bringing claims for injuries to their citizens. In
upholding Massachusetts’ vaccine law in Jacobson, the Court ruled that
“[t]he mode or manner [of exercising the state’s police power] is within
the discretion of the state” so long as the Constitution of the United
States is not contravened.335
Jacobson’s recognition of police powers justifying compulsory vaccina-
tion should be read in the context of the Lochner v. New York decision,
which was handed down the same year.336 Lochner famously stands as
the high-water mark in constraining state police power.337 To reconcile
the tension, the Court relied on a categorical distinction between “true”
exercises of police powers and illegitimate ones—never mind that New
York’s legislature had health concerns about the effect long work weeks
had on its bakers in Lochner. Professor Morton Horwitz’s analysis of the
analytic reasoning mode in this era suggests a legal process dominated by
rigid, categorical thinking: “[C]lear, distinct, bright-line classifications of
legal phenomena.”338 Rather than thinking about police powers on a con-
tinuum, nineteenth century reasoning divided them into “differences of
kind.”339 Massachusetts’ interest in vaccinating its citizens implicated a
kind of public interest that differed from New York’s interest in the pri-
vate working conditions of its bakers. One was allowed, and the other
was not.
330. Id. at 9.
331. Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 231, at 474 (“When the Court inaugurated
what we have identified as police power standing in [original jurisdiction] nuisance and
water rights cases, it . . . operated squarely within the area of health, safety, and welfare
encompassed by even limited views of state regulatory power.”).
332. See id.
333. 197 U.S. 11, 11 (1905); see also Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 346 (1997)
(reaffirming Jacobson).
334. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 35.
335. Id. at 25.
336. 198 U.S. 45, 45 (1905).
337. Id. at 64 (“It is impossible for us to shut our eyes to the fact that many of the laws
of this character, while passed under what is claimed to be the police power for the purpose
of protecting the public health or welfare, are, in reality, passed from other motives.”) (em-
phasis added).
338. HORWITZ, supra note 173, at 17.
339. Id.
2016] Parens Patriae and The States’ Historic Police Power 805
This understanding of police powers in the Lochner era translated to
the states’ parens patriae power, and the Court rejected the parens pa-
triae cases implicating economic interests benefiting particular favored
classes. In other words, the Court was suspicious if a state exercised
guardianship of select, privileged citizens rather than the general public
interest. For example, New Hampshire v. Louisiana involved a dispute
over assignment of overdue bonds issued by Louisiana but held by re-
sidents of New Hampshire and New York.340 The latter states had en-
acted laws enabling their citizens to assign the bonds to the state attorney
general so that he could sue in the state’s name to recover the money
owed, evading the Eleventh Amendment’s constitutional protection for
Louisiana.341 Although the Court’s reasoning turned on the precision of
its own limited original jurisdiction, the act of “assuming the prosecution
of debts owing by the other state to its citizens,”342 fell outside the frame-
work of the core police powers, as the concept was then understood. In
Freund’s helpful terms, New York and New Hampshire were working for
the benefit of a particular group of bondholders, an area he understood
to be outside the police powers in that era.343
Similarly, when the Court held that Massachusetts lacked parens pa-
triae authority to sue to declare an Act of Congress unconstitutional,344
the holding ultimately reflected a judgment about the state’s police pow-
ers not encompassing any authority to interfere with its citizens’ relation-
ship with the federal government.345 Such a power would obviously
contravene the constitution’s structure, and thus would not fall within the
state’s own police powers
After the Court’s eventual repudiation of Lochner’s restrictive view of
police powers, the states’ police powers quickly expanded.346 Rapid social
change challenged the viability of the era’s rigid categories, and they be-
gan to fall apart.347 By the 1990s, the states’ tool of choice to protect
public health against nicotine addiction was litigation. Both the early vac-
cine laws and the modern tobacco litigation reflect the same species of
police power: the states simply used different tools to accomplish the
public heath ends. Indeed, the states’ police powers have historically been
especially strong in this area. Professor Edward Richards has pointed out
that by the late 1990s, in the area of public health, in “almost all cases
where the extent of police power has been at issue, the state and federal
340. 108 U.S. 76, 78 (1883).
341. Id. at 76.
342. Id. at 91.
343. FREUND, supra note 319, at 743–44.
344. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485–86 (1923).
345. See id.
346. Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 231, at 474 (“With the demise of Lochner, how-
ever, the Court largely abandoned the attempt to set limits on the appropriate ends of
government.”).
347. HORWITZ, supra note 173, at 30 (“[A]ny categorical distinction between the health
of a worker and the conditions of industrial life became ever more difficult to maintain.”).
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courts [ ] found in favor of the state.”348 The states’ success with ex-
panding parens patriae power to mass torts in the tobacco litigation is
thus not surprising when framed in the context of health-related police
powers.
This expansion of police powers occurred both in the context of the
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction (state suing state) and in the con-
text of traditional litigation (state suing private defendants). For example,
in Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, Pennsylvania acted to protect its con-
sumers by bringing suit over a neighboring state’s restriction on natural
gas distributions.349 Similarly, Georgia sued railroads for conspiring to
economically discriminate against the state.350 The Supreme Court also
approved Puerto Rico’s use of the power to sue employers for discrimi-
nating against its citizens in Snapp.351
Snapp’s approach to trying to define quasi-sovereign interests in the
parens patriae context ultimately devolves into a recitation of police pow-
ers, though the Court did not call them that: “[T]he health and well-be-
ing—both physical and economic—of its residents in general.”352 When
the Court tried to identify the sovereign interest by suggesting it ought to
be the kind a state could address through legislative power,353 it was
again nodding toward the police powers that are the essence of the state
lawmaking domain. The Court’s focus on the generality of the effects of
the state action similarly echoes the Lochner era understanding of the
police power described by Freund: namely, relating to the good of the
community, as opposed to the benefit of favored classes.354
The evolution of the parens patriae power to encompass antitrust and
consumer deception reflects the evolution in the twentieth century of an
understanding of the market as a community good. After Lochner’s de-
mise during the New Deal era, state regulation of economic interests be-
came routine. By the 1970s, courts began extending the parens patriae
power to antitrust. In the 1990s, when they extended it to consumer pro-
tection, state regulation in those areas pursuant to the police powers was
universally accepted. The expansion of parens patriae power thus can be
seen as running in tandem with the social context defining contemporary
understanding of police powers regarding economic markets.
348. Edward P. Richards, The Police Power and the Regulation of Medical Practice: A
Historical Review and Guide for Medical Licensing Board Regulation of Physicians in ER-
ISA-Qualified Managed Care Organizations, 8 ANNALS HEALTH L. 201, 201 (1999); see
also id. at 206 (“[T]he United States Supreme Court has not substantially limited the police
power as it relates to public health disease control.”). Professor Richards observes that
police powers related to public health had deep roots in the colonial experience with wide-
spread disease, particularly yellow fever. Id. at 204–05.
349. 262 U.S. 553, 591–92 (1923).
350. Georgia v. Pa. R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 444, 450 (1945).
351. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607–08
(1982).
352. Id. at 607.
353. Id.
354. See id. at 607–08; FREUND, supra note 319, at 5.
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The regulatory aspect of parens patriae observed by Professors Gill-
man and Cox reflects state commitments to exercising police powers for
specific kinds of harm to the public welfare (in the sense of harm to mar-
kets, health, and collective economies).355 Litigation became a form of
corporate censure by state governments, and the resulting settlement
agreements became a form of governmental control.
The Court has sometimes discussed the police powers in the context of
creating standing to bring suit in federal court.356 In reality, though, these
powers have less to do with standing to bring a matter before a federal
court than they do with the state’s power to bring suit at all. They relate
to the scope of the state’s powers in its own regulatory sphere, and for
parens patriae, they are a reflection of law enforcement powers.357 Re-
striction of parens patriae power would therefore not be a procedural
reform comparable to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23; it would be a
substantive curtailment of state regulatory authority in the sphere of its
own police powers. Such a reform would be a major shift in the balance
of federalism.
C. RECONSTRUCTING MODERN PARENS PATRIAE DOCTRINE
THROUGH THE POLICE POWER
This Article has argued that parens patriae has little basis in the histori-
cal narrative that courts have often invoked to justify the doctrine’s exis-
tence, and state assertions of the power instead evolved to reflect
changing understandings of state police powers. Nevertheless, there is
one feature of modern parens patriae practice that still contains a faint
echo of the Framing era’s disputes over the power to supervise charities
transferred from England. Many scholars have observed that the practice
has become largely statutory—meaning state and federal statutes define
most state powers to seek public compensation in modern practice,358 so
that common law parens patriae actions have become exceedingly rare.359
Professor Cox has observed that common law assertions of parens patriae
power have simply become unnecessary in light of expansive modern
statutory authority for states to sue to protect the public interest.360
Professor Cox’s exhaustive research on modern public compensation
practice suggests that a complex web of statutes (state and federal) now
tend to define state governmental power to sue as guardian of the citi-
355. See GILLMAN, supra note 308, at 48–49; Cox, supra note 8, at 2317–22.
356. See Snapp, 258 U.S. at 607 (“One helpful indication in determining whether an
alleged injury to the health and welfare of its citizens suffices to give the State standing to
sue as parens patriae is whether the injury is one that the State, if it could, would likely
attempt to address through its sovereign lawmaking powers.”) (emphasis added); see also
Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 231, at 476–77 (discussing police powers and standing
in federal court).
357. See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 231, at 477.
358. Cox, supra note 8, at 2329–30, 2335–36.
359. Id. at 2328 (“Government enforcers rarely rely on common law parens doctrine for
public compensation.”).
360. Id. at 2328–29.
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zens’ health, safety and welfare.361 Defining the state’s guardianship role
in statutes arguably more accurately reflects the English structure of
power received by the states at the time of Independence in the early
charity cases: a system of statutory powers that creates a legislative
framework for courts. England transmitted not the prerogatives of an ab-
solutist monarchy, but the complex powers of King-in-Parliament, where
legislation shaped the government’s power and was supplemented
through common law.
Modern statutory iterations of the parens patriae power embody this
spirit. Nevertheless, some states also still rely on their own common law
as a source of this power. Additionally, Congress has also conferred fed-
eral statutory power to state attorneys general to sue on specific matters
with a federal right of action. All of these sources of modern state parens
patriae power are uncontroversial in areas where the historic police pow-
ers are assumed. There is one source, however, that does not fit this
mold—federal common law.
The topology of sources of power can be illustrated as follows:
1 2
State Statutes State Common Law
(conferring power on the state (conferring power on the state
Attorney General) Attorney General)
3 4
Federal Statutes Federal Common Law
(conferring power on the state (conferring power on the state
Attorney General) Attorney General)
Figure 1
The top row represents sources in which we expect states to express
their understanding of their own police powers. Indeed, the Framing Era
cases showed states developing their own legislative and common law
sources of authority in the early charity cases.362 Modern examples in-
clude state Unfair Competition Law and false advertising statutes.363
These reflect state laws about state powers in areas of state concern—
classic forms of law-making about areas constitutionally entrusted to the
states. The bottom row of the chart is different. In the third box, Congress
confers parens patriae powers upon state attorneys general through fed-
eral legislation with regard to particular subjects, in areas where federal
and state power coexists (for example, in the Clayton Act of 1914).364
Here, Congress creates a federal right to sue on an area within its Article
I powers, but it assigns the right to sue to state attorneys general (i.e.,
361. See id. at 2331.
362. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27; 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53.
363. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (prohibiting “unlawful, unfair or fraud-
ulent business act[s] or practice[s] and unfair, deceptive, untrue, or misleading advertis-
ing”); id. § 17204 (giving Attorney General power to seek relief for such acts).
364. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
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giving the states the opportunity to bring enforcement suits, should they
choose to do so). There is nothing controversial about such an exercise of
Article I power by Congress. All three of these sources of parens patriae
power thus have a firm constitutional basis.
The fourth box is historically troublesome. It purports to ground state
parens patriae power in federal common law. Nineteenth-century federal
cases such as Latter-Day Saints derived inherent powers from the federal
general law that Erie abolished. The federal common law cases could be
reformed simply by recognizing the states’ historic police powers as the
source of their parens patriae powers (as in the early environment and
public health suits). This would imply, however, that Latter-Day Saints
erred by assuming the federal government’s parens patriae power was
equivalent to that of the states’.
If the history of parens patriae power in the early cases means anything
for the vast modern practice of state involvement in mass tort cases, it
ought to be read as reflecting the Framing Era’s insight that common law
police powers were subject to legislative constraints. Regardless whether
the Statute of Elizabeth was or was not received by a particular state, its
existence in England transformed ancient royal prerogatives into matters
subject to parliamentary sovereignty and laid the groundwork for the
modern regulatory litigation scheme. State and federal legislative control
over the executive exercise of public litigation still largely reflects a distri-
bution of power that comports in a very general sense with that structural
heritage. However, the parens patriae power in all its iterations (statutory
or common law) flows from the federalism built into our constitutional
structure through the state police powers. The power has its firmest his-
torical foundation where the states define it for themselves in the context
of their own regulatory priorities.
Reconstructing the foundation for modern parens patriae power as a
function of state police power hints at why that doctrine ought not to be
reduced to a mere analog of class actions under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23. Different values animate the two forms of litigation. The
parens patriae doctrine lacks the constraints of Rule 23 because it reflects
a fundamental form of state power in which those constraints simply have
no historical, structural, or functional constitutional purpose. From the
earliest days, the manner in which states exercise their police powers is
flexible, open, and unconstrained by federal policy choices where there is
no preemption. Indeed, the flexibility of the doctrine reflects the value of
states as experimental innovators and independent regulators.365 The var-
iations in the expression, utilization, and extent of parens patriae among
the several states creates space for local policy choices, experimentation,
and varying expressions of enforcement priorities. For this reason, con-
verging class action rules and parens patriae would undercut the core val-
365. Constraining the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 303, at 224 (discuss-
ing “the Jeffersonian view of states as experimental actors capable of innovative policy
approaches that can be implemented on a small scale to test their efficacy”).
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ues underlying parens patriae as an expression of the police powers.
Shoehorning parens patriae actions into the procedural mold of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure creates convenient symmetry for scholars
and practitioners acculturated to Rule 23, but it eviscerates the historical
relationship between parens patriae and the states’ police powers.
CONCLUSION
The parens patriae doctrine has had the misfortune of being draped in
the mythological trappings of royalty. The fiction of its English common
law roots connecting it to the guardianship of “infants, idiots, and lunat-
ics” has led to confusion as to its contours and has sometimes made the
precedent seem unhinged from the doctrine’s purpose.
Reconstructing the doctrine with an American history connected to the
social compact of the Constitution and the states’ historic police powers
offers a better foundation for understanding its development, use, and
limitations. The cases reflect the elasticity of the police powers and the
evolution of the social mores regarding the role of the state in regulating
economic interests. Situating the cases within such contemporary under-
standings of the police powers yields better predictability and explains
the vast changes the doctrine has experienced in the last two decades.
The murkiness of states’ parens patriae powers can become transparent
only when those powers have a historical and structural foundation. The
aim of this Article was not to resolve all of the uncertainties that exist
around the doctrine’s contours. Rather, the Article’s clarification of the
history and purpose of the doctrine may open up space for future work
that accomplishes this goal.
